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Abstract (Executive Summary) 
A group taxation regime can be defined as: 
"a set of rules that enables corporate taxpayers to compute the tax liability of related corporations on a 
consolidated or combined basis(.) (and) ... encompasses not only full consolidation. but also tranifer of 
particular tax allributes between the members (?f a corporate group .. I. 
This definition is very broad and group taxation could be better understood when 
considering the more common forms of group taxation such as the group relief regime 
and the consolidation regime. The consolidation regime generally involves each 
company within a group of companies computing its own income after which the income 
is consolidated at the holding company-level for tax purposes. The holding company 
would thereafter become liable for the group's tax2, whereas a group relief regime 
involves the ability of losses incurred by one company in a group of companies to be 
transferred to another member group company3. 
Does group taxation exist in South Africa? Based on the above, it would appear not. The 
more pertinent question that has to be answered is whether or not elements of group 
taxation currently exist in South African tax legislation. 
The debate in terms of the introduction of group taxation in South Africa was raised for 
the first time by the Margo Commission of Inquiry, which ultimately decided against 
recommending the introduction of group taxation. The Katz Commission of Inquiry 
however recommended the introduction of group taxation. National Treasury has 
however failed to act on the Katz Commission's recommendations. 
I Cahiers De Droit Fiscallntemational (2004), p.25 
~ Ibid. pp. 30 - 31 










It did however introduce the corporate rules in 200 I. These rules were introduced to 
prevent adverse CGT consequences arising in a group of companies' context and provide 
roll-over relief on the transfer of assets. In most instances, the roll-over relief is 
dependant on the existence of a group of companies, for example, in terms of the intra-
group provisions, the unbundling of unlisted companies, and liquidation transactions. In 
addition, the Income Tax Act4 contains many other provisions which have elements of 
group taxation such as, inter alia, section 9D (controlled foreign companies), section 
648(5)(f) (Secondary Companies Tax (STC) relief), section 64C(4)(k) (exemption from 
deemed dividend provisions), and paragraph 12(5) of the 8th Schedule to the Income Tax 
Act. Moreover, the Value Added Tax Act5, the Securities Transfer Tax Act6 and the 
Transfer Duty Act7 also make provision for tax relief in terms transactions covered by the 
corporate rules. 
The presence of the aforementioned provisions is indicative that elements of group 
taxation currently exist in South Africa, and it is submitted that South Africa is not 
prejudiced in not having a group taxation regime in place. Whilst it appears that National 
Treasury has been considering the viability of the introduction of group taxation, it does 
not appear to be a priority. 
As the South African tax base and the South African economy grows, it is inevitable that 
a group taxation regime would be introduced at some stage in the future. It is however 
submitted that South Africa does not need group taxation at this stage. 
4 No.58 of 1962 
5 No.89 of 1991 
6 No.25 of 2007 










Chapter I: Introduction 
The introduction of a group taxation regime in South Africa has previously been the 
subject of debate in South Africa. The reports of the Margo and Katz Commissions of 
Inquiry ("commissions") are cases in point. To this end, both commissions made certain 
recommendations in terms of group taxation and its application with reference to South 
Africa. 
Presently, there are certain aspects of South African tax legislation, for example, the 
corporate rules encapsulated in sections 41 to 47 of the Income Tax Act No.58 of 1962 
("the Income Tax Act") which bear some of the hallmarks of a fully fledged group-
taxation regime, for example, the section 45 intra-group relief provisions. This fact 
notwithstanding, the reality is that a group-tax regime currently does not exist in terms of 
the South African tax legislative framework. 
The aim of this research paper is, inter alia, to illustrate what the notion of group taxation 
entails. In doing so, the rationale behind its existence, as well the various forms thereof, 
are to be considered. This research paper will also highlight how two of the more 
common forms of group taxation regimes operate. In this regard, a broad overview of the 
regimes currently in place in Australia and the United Kingdom will be given. 
The findings and recommendations of the commissions will also be revisited. The reason 
for this being that an assessment will be made to determine to what extent, if at all, the 
recommendations of these commissions have been implemented by National Treasury. 
In performing this assessment, the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act, as well as 
other tax legislation which could be said to contain elements of group taxation, will be 
highlighted and discussed at a high-level. This research paper will also consider the 
explanatory memoranda issued by National Treasury when these provisions were first 
introduced, as well as the commentary of the International Fiscal Association ("the 
I FA"). In addition, the comments in the explanatory memoranda in terms of any 










group tax regime in the Income Tax Act and other tax legislation differs to that of a 
'normal' group tax regime will also be documented. 
In order to ascertain why the recommendations of the Katz Commission in particular 
were not fully implemented and whether or not it is envisaged that a group tax regime is 
to be introduced in South Africa in the foreseeable future, the informal views (based on 
an interview conducted) of a senior official of the Department of National Treasury will 
be documented and commented upon. 
This research paper will conclude by evaluating whether the non-introduction of a group 
taxation regime has benefitted or prejudiced South African taxpayers and whether or not 
there are any potential benefits for taxpayers should a group taxation regime be 











Chapter 2: What is Group Taxation? 
2. What is group taxation and what is its relevance in the context of South Africa? 
Group taxation from a South African perspective was first considered as far back as in 
the latter part of the 1980's when its viability as a corporate taxation regime was 
deliberated upon by the Margo Commission. Its suitability in a South African context 
was revisited in 1995 by the Katz Commission which recommended its viability as a 
taxation regime for South Africa. A more detailed discussion of the findings of both the 
Margo and Katz Commissions is addressed in Chapter 3 below. 
2.1 What is the significance of group taxation in a South African context? 
This question is relevant as neither the Income Tax Act, nor any of the other South 
African tax legislation for that matter, make provision for group taxation in the manner in 
which it is generally understood. The Income Tax Act instead imposes tax, inter alia. on 
a South Africa resident corporate entity (to the extent that it is in a tax-paying position) 
irrespective of whether or not that company is part of a group of companies l . This is in 
stark contrast to a group taxation regime where a group of companies is, for example. 
either consolidated into one single entity for tax purposes or where, for example, a 
company forming part of a group of companies, which is in a loss-making position, is 
permitted to transfer its losses to a profit-making company in the same group. 
Notwithstanding that the South African tax legislative framework does not cater for a 
group taxation regime per se, a discussion on it is relevant as South Africa is increasingly 
becoming an important role-player in the international community. 
Fifteen years since the advent of democracy sees South Africa as one of the most 
important countries on the African continent from a political and economic perspective. 
I Paragraph (i) of the definition of 'gross income' as defined in section I of the Act read together with 











South Africa is also a respected member of the international community and has, since its 
reintegration into the international community, become a target for foreign investors who 
are keen to do business in South Africa. This keenness may have been tempered to a 
large extent by the global economic meltdown, but the interest and willingness to invest 
in South Africa appears to remain. 
Whilst the high cost of labour in South Africa does pose some challenges, the relatively 
high rate of corporate taxation (in comparison to other developing economies such as 
Brazil, China and some of the East-European bloc countries) acts as a disincentive to 
foreign companies wanting to invest in South Africi. Other disincentives include the 
high cost of labour in comparison to other developing economies (in this regard China 
and India are at the forefront in terms of their cheap cost of labour). The existence of a 
group taxation regime, which should reduce the effective tax rate of a group, could 
however act as an incentive to foreign conglomerates to invest in South Africa and to set-
up business in South Africa. 
In this regard, these foreign conglomerates, being fully aware that their investment would 
lead to an inflow of valuable foreign exchange, would undoubtedly seek to extract the 
highest possible return on their investment in South Africa, and one of the areas which 
could assist in this regard is group taxation. 
South African companies, in particular, groups of companies, also stand to benefit were a 
group taxation regime to be implemented. Evidence of this can be seen in terms of how 
much the corporate sector contributes towards the national revenue, as corporate income 
tax is one of the most significant contributors to the total revenue collected by the South 
African Revenue Service ("SARS"). Total revenue collected by SARS for the 2008/2009 
tax year totalled R625,57 billion rand, of which the main contributors were personal 
income tax (R 197,07 billion), corporate income tax (R 165,23 billion), and Value-Added 
~ Based on the corporate taxation rates highlighted in "The 2009 Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide", Ernst 











Tax ("VAT") (RI53,81 billionl The presence ofa favourable group tax regime could 
also inspire global companies to increase their investment spend in South Africa which in 
tum could lead to the generation of increased revenue, and more importantly, could 
potentially lead to the creation of employment opportunities, thereby contributing 
towards reducing the rate of unemployment in South Africa. 
On the international stage, the current global economic meltdown has seen the closure of 
well-known financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers and also the buckling of two 
traditional American carmakers. Recently, the biggest carmaker in the world, General 
Motors, an American automobile manufacturer, filed for bankruptcy protection. 
To assist with preventing similar events from occurring in South Africa, the call has been 
made by commentators for government to consider introducing a group taxation regime 
in South Africa4 5. This could potentially ensure the survival of many groups as 
companies forming part of a group could potentially, (depending on which form of group 
tax regime would be implemented), be permitted to transfer their losses to companies 
which are in a profit-making position. The further upshot of this could, (other things 
remaining equal), be that the unemployment rate would not be subject to exponential 
increases as the continued existence of companies currently teetering on the brink could 
be secured. 
Whilst much has been said about how a group tax regime could potentially be of benefit 
to South Africa6 7, the following question needs to be addressed: 
3 Media Statement - Minister of Finance, I April 2009, pp. I to 3 
4 Tickle, D, (2009), p.1 "Full group tax system imperative in current economic meltdown" - SAICA 
Communique News Service - 18 June 2009 
5 With reference to the possible introduction of group taxation, the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants C'SAICA") has, in terms of its agenda for the 2009 SAICA Tax Conference listed as one of 
the main topics, the question of whether or not South Africa is ready for group tax and what the real 
advantages and disadvantages thereof are (www.saica.co.zaibrochures/). 
6 Ibid. pp.1 to 2 











What is a group taxation regime? 
2.2 What is a Group Taxation regime? 
A group taxation regime can be defined as: 
"a set of rules that enables corporate taxpayers to compute the tax liability of related 
corporations on a consolidated or combined basis. Th(is) term ... encompasses not only filII 
consolidation, but also transfer of particular tax attributes between the members of a corporate 
group',s. 
This definition is very broad and does not provide any clarity other than that the tax 
position of a group of companies will be considered on a consolidated or combined basis 
with a view towards ascertaining what the net result would be after the consolidation or 
combination of all the accounts of the respective companies forming part of the group. 
Adding to the difficulty of trying to give more definition to what constitutes a group 
taxation regime is that group taxation has been applied in different forms across the 
globe. 
A study conducted by the IF A, a Netherlands based non-governmental and international 
non-profit organisation which focuses on the study of international tax law9 highlighted 
the following as the more common forms of group taxation regimes: 
2.2.1 The Organschafi Regime lO 
In terms of this regIme, subsidiaries having one common holding company are 
considered to be 'organs' of the holding company and are treated as one composite body. 
8 Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International (2004), p.25 
9 Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International (2004) 











The main feature of the Organschaft regime is that profits and losses of the subsidiaries 
are attributed to the holding company. This regime however does not cater for the 
deferral of gains or losses arising from the intra-group transfer of assets. Organschaft 
regimes are found in Germany and Austria II. 
2.2.2 The Group Contribution Regime 12 
This type of regime permits subsidiaries in a group to engage in a practice referred to as 
income shifting, in terms of which a profit-making company in the group is permitted to 
make a contribution to a loss-making company in the group coupled with the fact that the 
company making the contribution would be entitled to deduct the amount contributed 
from its tax base. By the same token, the company receiving the income contribution 
would include the amount received in its taxable income. This has the effect that profits 
and losses of companies in the group are off-set. The IFA's study has furthermore 
revealed that an important feature of this regime is that the tax relief is based on the 
transfer of wealth. This regime appears to have found favour in the Nordic region and is 
currently applied in Sweden, Norway and Finland 13• 
2.2.3 The Group Relief Regime 14 
This regime is also commonly referred to as the loss relief model. In terms of this regime 
losses incurred by one company in a group are permitted to be transferred to another 
group companyl5. This could result in a company which would previously have been in a 
taxpaying position subsequently finding itself in a position in which it would pay less tax 
than it would have before the transfer of the losses from its fellow group company. It 
II Id. p.29 
12 Id. p.29 
13 Ibid. pp.29 - 30 
14 Id. p.30 











could even result in the company ending up in a tax neutral positionl 6• What 
distinguishes this regime from the group contribution regime is that tax losses are 
transferred as opposed to the shifting of profits within a group. Group relief regimes are 
applied in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Singapore 17• 
2.2..1 The Consolidation Regime l8 
This regime typically involves each company computing its own income after which the 
income is consolidated at the holding company-level. The holding company would 
thereafter become liable for the group's tax l9. The IFA's investigations have revealed 
that this regime itself has been applied in different forms. 
The consolidation regime is, amongst others, currently applied in Australia, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Japan and the Unites States of America20• 
At this juncture, it makes sense to comment on two of the more common forms of group 
taxation regimes, i.e. the consolidation and the group relief regimes and how they have 
been applied in practice. 
In Chapter 3 the salient features of the group taxation regimes applicable in Australia and 
the United Kingdom ("UK") will be highlighted. Australia applies the consolidation 
regime and the UK, the group relief regime. 
16 Tickle, D, (2009), p.1 "Full group tax system imperative in current economic meltdown" - SAICA 
Communique News Service - 18 June 2009 
17 Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International (2004), page 30 
18 Id. p.30 
1'1 Ibid. pp. 30 - 31 











Chapter 3: Group Taxation in an international context: Australia and the UK 
Chapter 2 included a discussion on what a group taxation regime entails and highlighted 
four typical models of group taxation. 
This chapter deals, in summary, with how a consolidation group taxation regime and a 
group relief taxation regime operate in practice. In this regard, reference will be made to 
the Australian and United Kingdom taxation regimes. 
3.1 Group Taxation in Australitl1 
3.1.1 General 
Group taxation came into operation in Australia with inception from I July 2002. The 
form of group taxation introduced was the 'consolidation' group taxation regime. The 
information as set-out below presents an overview of this regime as it applies in Australia 
and is not designed to exhaustively illustrate the mechanics thereof. 
In providing this overview, the most significant aspects of this regime with reference to 
its application in Australia, will be highlighted. Certain areas have however been 
discussed slightly more in depth than others. 
Groups (i.e. groups of companies) in Australia have a choice on whether or not they wish 
to consolidate for tax purposes. This choice must be made in the year the consolidated 
group is formed and before the due date for the submission of the tax return for that year. 
21 Infonnation on the Australian consolidation regime highlighted herein was obtained from Greenwoods 
and Freehills (2004), as well as the explanatory memoranda in tenns of subsequent amendments up to and 
including the Taxation Amendment (2006 Measures No.4) Act 2006 published on the Australian Taxation 
Office website (www.ato.gov.au/consolidation). Greenwoods and Freehills are Australian tax experts and 











Once the election to consolidate has been made, all subsidiaries forming part of the group 
must form part of the consolidated group (i.e. there is no choice on whether or not to 
include or exclude a subsidiary from the consolidated group). This is commonly referred 
to as the 'one in, all in' principle. In order for a group to be in a position to consolidate, 
there must be a head company and at least one subsidiary member. In order to qualify as 
a head company, a company has to be an Australian resident with at least some of its 
income being subject to tax at the general corporate tax rate and must not be a wholly-
owned subsidiary of an Australian resident company. Corporate unit trusts or public 
trading trusts also qualify as head companies and are capable of electing to consolidate22. 
Subsidiaries of a group however, have to be 100% beneficially owned, directly or 
indirectly, by the head company or any other subsidiary in the group. Companies, trusts 
and partnerships are entities capable of being subsidiaries of a head company and are 
required to meet certain Australian residency requirements. Charities are precluded from 
being part of a consolidated group. 
The consolidation regime also caters for "Multiple Entry Consolidated' C'MEC") groups. 
This is a departure from the standard rule by virtue of the fact that consolidation would be 
available to Australian resident subsidiaries having a foreign holding company, even 
though there may not be an Australian resident head company in the group structure. An 
MEC is treated on the same footing as a classic consolidated group. 
It is important to note that the 100% holding requirement in terms of a normal group is 
equally applicable to a MEC group i.e. the foreign holding company must hold, directly 
or indirectly, 100% of the Australian resident subsidiary companies. Of great 
significance however is the fact that the 'one in, all in' principle (applicable to the classic 
consolidated model) does not apply in terms of a MEC group. There are various options 
~~ These trusts are used for infrastructure developments in Australia. They are taxed as companies but are 
also subject to certain rules applicable to trusts. These trusts, once having elected to consolidate, are taxed 











available to subsidiaries of the non-resident holding company in that they can choose 
which of their fellow subsidiaries they wish to have in their consolidated group. 
3.1.2 Implications of consolidation 
As indicated in Chapter 2 above, the implication of consolidation is that the group is 
treated as a single entity. Consequently, a single tax return is submitted on behalf of the 
group and all intra-group transfers, shareholdings and loans are ignored for tax purposes. 
Furthermore, all assets, liabilities and tax losses (i.e. including those of all the 
subsidiaries) are attributed to the head company on consolidation. 
The tax cost of assets attributed to the head company is the cost of the head company's 
investment (i.e. shareholding) in the subsidiary owning the assets. The allocation of these 
tax costs are subject to a prescribed cost-setting process. 
Important to note in terms of this process, is that the level of attribution of the tax losses 
of a subsidiary to the head company is dependent on whether or not the subsidiary was 
part of the group at the time of consolidation. Ring-fencing rules do not appear to apply 
in terms of this process. There are also implications in terms of the pre-consolidation 
capital gains tax ("CGT") roll-overs arising from intra-group transfers and the setting of 
the costs could give rise to a capital gain in the head company's hands. There is no 
setting of costs as described above with reference to the assets of each first onshore 
company in a MEC group, as each company is effectively a head company of its own 
"group' and as the tax costs of assets for a head company in a consolidated group are not 
set, it is deemed inappropriate to allow foreign-owned companies in an identical position 
to access the tax cost setting provisions simply due to them being part of a MEC group. 
The cost-setting exercise gives rise to the notion of an allocable cost amount which has to 
be allocated to the subsidiary's assets. A set procedure (as alluded to above and not 











A subsidiary which becomes part of the consolidated group is, subject to certain 
limitations and/ or conditions, permitted to bring its pre-consolidated losses into the 
group. No ring-fencing rules appear to have application. There are tests laid down for 
determining the extent of the transferrable loss. In this regard, tests are conducted to see 
whether or not the same level of ownership exists after consolidation, and also, whether 
or not the head company is engaged in the same business as the subsidiary. There are 
also certain limitations placed on the head company in terms of the utilisation of those 
losses. 
Where the losses are transferred from the subsidiary to the head company, the head 
company is deemed to have incurred the loss in the year in which that loss was 
transferred to it. All losses transferred by a joining subsidiary retain their respective 
natures, for example, a capital loss transferred remains a capital loss and a revenue loss 
transferred remains a revenue loss. Furthermore, losses transferred from a joining 
subsidiary can only be utilised after the losses which have been generated within the 
consolidated group have been used. 
The tax credits of a subsidiary (if any) are also transferred to the head company. Tax 
credits are determined with reference to a 'franking account'. This account records tax 
paid by the capture of corporate tax paid and attaching it to dividends paid to 
shareholders. Tax credits of a company are referred to as 'franking credits'. The 
franking credits of subsidiaries within a consolidated group are transferred to the head 
company, who keeps a 'franking account' on behalf of the consolidated group. Debit 
balances on a franking account are however not transferred to a head company. The 
subsidiary would generally settle this deficit. This payment can however be utilised by 
the head company as set-off against future income tax liabilities. 
Australian compames who hold an interest of greater than ten percent in a foreign 
company are able to receive tax-free dividends from these foreign companies. These 
dividends are recorded in a foreign dividend account. One foreign dividend account is 











transferred by subsidiaries to the head company (upon joining the group). The existence 
of a surplus on a group foreign dividend account could result in dividends paid to non-
residents being free from dividend withholding tax. 
Income of a controlled foreign company ("CFC") in terms of an Australian company, 
which has been taxed in Australia, can be repatriated into Australia as tax-free dividends. 
Accounts are kept to keep track of these balances. Only one such account is kept by the 
head of a consolidated group. 
Furthermore, whilst the head of a group is the taxpayer and is responsible for the payment 
of taxes on behalf of the group, the failure by it to meet its obligations to thejisclls in this 
regard is tempered by the fact that all the companies forming part of the group are jointly 
and severally liable for the taxes liable to be paid to the jisCliS. Should such 
circumstances eventuate, the liability of the companies can be minimised where a valid 
tax sharing agreement has been entered into between the members of a consolidated 
group. 
3./.3 Implications (if exiting the consolidated group 
Notwithstanding the 'one-in, all-in' principle, subsidiaries are permitted to exit a 
consolidated group, if ceasing to form part of the consolidated group. 
An exit of a subsidiary from a group can give rise to a capital gain or loss in the hands of 
the head company. This can arise due to the fact that the tax cost of the head company's 
interest in the subsidiary having to be revalued. The revaluation effectively reverses the 
exercise in terms of which the allocable cost amount was arrived at. Furthermore, where 
a subsidiary exits a group and leaves with the same liabilities that it brought into the 
group, the value of those liabilities would be the same as the value thereof at the time of 











A subsidiary is also precluded from taking any franking credits and any foreign dividend 
account balance with it upon exiting a group. Where a subsidiary holds an interest in a 
CFC, a portion of the credits based on its shareholding in a CFC is returned to it. 
The aforementioned represents an overview of how a consolidation group taxation 
regime operates in practice. 
As indicated in Chapter I, companies which form part of a group are all taxpayers in their 
own right, and are required to submit their own tax returns. Whilst the Income Tax Act 
does provide for roll-over relief in terms of intra-group transactions, as well as other 
forms of tax relieF3, these relief rules are significantly less complex than those in terms 
of the Australian consolidation regime. The Australian consolidation regime does 
however appear to provide corporate groups with tax relief that is significantly higher 
than that provided for by the Income Tax Act24• 
3.1A The Fiscal Unity consolidation model 
A more relaxed consolidation model applies in the Netherlands. Whilst the details of this 
regime will not be discussed herein, the essence of this group taxation regime is that the 
Netherlands applies the 'fiscal unity' regime25 • The following are the significant features 
of the fiscal unity regime: 
• The parent company must own at least a 95% interest in the subsidiary; 
• Dutch resident and non-resident companies could be included in a fiscal unity 
provided the place of effective management in terms of these companies is 
23 To be the subject of discussion in Chapter 6 and 7 
24 As stated above, the tax relief available to South African groups will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6 and 7 












located in the Netherlands. A fiscal unity could also include the permanent 
establishment of a company that is effectively managed in a non-Dutch 
jurisdiction; and 
• A subsidiary could, from the date of its acquisition, be included in a fiscal unity26. 
The advantages of being part of a fiscal unity are the following: 
• The losses of a subsidiary may be offset against profits of other member group 
companies; 
• There are no direct tax consequences in terms of reorganisations and the 
movements of assets with hidden reserves from one company to another; and 
• Inter-company profits are capable of being fully deferred27• 
These high-level remarks about the fiscal unity regime are relevant, as it appears, (based 
on the remarks of a senior official of National Treasury), that the relaxed approach in 
terms thereof could possibly be of application (to a very limited extent) in South Africa28. 
Another preferred group taxation regime (internationally) is the Group Relief regime. 
For an overview of how a Group Relief taxation regime operates in practice, regard will 
be had to how the mechanics of this regime operates in the context of the United 
Kingdom's ("UK's") tax legislation. 
As in the case of the discussion of the Australian group taxation regime, the discussion 
below is intended to provide an overview of how the Group Relief ('"Group relief") 
~6 Ibid. pp.696 to 697 
~7 Id. p.697 
~8 The content of the informal views expressed by the senior official of National Treasury are addressed in 











taxation regime is applied in the UK and is not intended to provide an exhaustive 
illustration ofthe mechanics of this regime. 
3.2 Group Taxation in the UK29 
The UK recognises a group of companies as a single economic unit and various reliefs 
are afforded to corporate groups in the UK3o. The IF A is of the view that these reliefs are 
key features of the UK tax system and are also widely used31 • Group relief in the UK 
context is aimed at enabling a company within a group of companies to surrender trading 
losses, excess interest expenses on borrowings, excess capital allowances, excess 
management expenses, charges on income and certain losses relating to intangibles32• 
This generally takes place in the following instances: 
• The surrender by a subsidiary of its losses to its holding company; 
• The surrender by the holding company of its losses to its subsidiary or 
subsidiaries; and 
• The surrender of its losses by one subsidiary to another subsidiary within the 
same group of companies. 
It is important to note that where a company surrenders its losses to a fellow group 
company, in circumstances where its losses are greater than the profits of the feIlow 
group company, the company would only be permitted to surrender its losses to the 
extent that the profit of the fellow group company would be reduced to zero. 
~9 Infonnation on the UK group taxation regime has been obtained from Cahiers Du Droit Fiscal 
International (2004) and Tolley Tax Training - LexisNexis (2008) and the infonnation thereon is in 
tenns of the group tax legislation as it was up to 2008 
JO Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International (2004), page 687 
31 Id. p687 











Group relief in the UK has application at two different levels: 
• Group relief (in the first instance); and 
• Consortium relief (if applicable, after the application of group relief). 
3.2.1 Group relief 
Group relief is available to companies forming part of a group of companies. Unlike 
Australia which has a 100% holding requirement, a group of companies (in the UK group 
relief scenario) involves one company holding an interest in another company, directly or 
indirectly, of at least 75%33. The 75% interest held by the holding company (referred to 
as the equitable ownership in the subsidiary) includes the presence of the following: 
• Ownership of the ordinary share capital of a subsidiary must at least be at the 
75% level; 
• The interest in the subsidiary must entitle the holding company to at least 75% of 
the subsidiary's available distributable profits; and 
• The interest in the subsidiary must entitle the holding company to at least 75% of 
the subsidiary's assets on the winding-up of the subsidiary34. 
It follows therefore, that a company joins a group when 75% of its equitable ownership 
vests in the group holding company. In line with this, only losses that are incurred after 
joining the group would qualify for the group relief35. A company is regarded as having 
left the group when arrangements for the sale of the holding company's interest in it have 
33 Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International (2004), page 688; Tolley Tax Training - LexisNexis (2008), page 
17.2 
34 Tolley Tax Training - LexisNexis (2008), page 17.2 











come into force36, as opposed to the actual divestment by the holding company of its 
equitable ownership in the subsidiary. Arrangements could be said to come into force 
where, for example, the disposal of the interest in a subsidiary has been approved by the 
shareholders37, or where a contract for the disposal of the interest in the subsidiary has 
been agreed to between the parties to the agreemenes. 
Noteworthy however is the fact that an international group of companies would be 
recognised for the purposes of the group relief provisions, provided that the 75% 
equitable ownership requirement as outlined above has been satisfied. Based on this, 
losses between UK subsidiaries (or UK branches) of a non-UK resident holding 
company39 are capable of being transferred. Losses of non-resident subsidiaries are also 
capable of utilisation in terms of the group relief provisions provided the non-resident 
subsidiaries are residents in countries falling within the European Economic Area. 
Furthermore, losses of offshore branches of UK-resident companies could also qualify for 
the group reliem. 
There are however various conditions that have to be satisfied before the losses of non-
resident subsidiaries and the losses of off-shore branches of UK resident companies can 
be utilised in terms of the group relief system. A discussion of these conditions is not 
required for purposes of this research paper and is therefore not addressed herein. 
The application of the group relief system could give rise to companies within the group 
being taxed at lower marginal rates (various marginal rates of taxation apply depending 
on the level of a company's notional profit41 ). Provision is also made for the time-
36 Id. p.IS.3 
17 Ibid p.IS.4 
18 Ibid. p.IS.5 
J'llbid. p.IS.7 
~o Ibid. p.IS.S 











apportionment of losses and profits in circumstances where companies within a group 
have different accounting periods42. 
3.2.2 Consortium Relief 
Consortium relief is considered to be a variation of group relief and applies in 
circumstances where losses of a 'consortium' company are capable of being transferred 
to consortium members, and conversely, where losses of consortium members are 
capable of being transferred to a 'consortium' company43. As will be seen further below, 
consortium relief ranks after group relief, and is applied after the group relief has been 
applied, or in instances where group relief is not applicable. 
A consortium company is a company in which consortium members hold an equitable 
ownership (as defined in terms of the group relief provisions) of at least 75% in a 
consortium company, and the consortium members are companies which individually 
have an equitable ownership of at least 5% in the consortium company44. Foreign 
companies are also capable of qualifying as consortium members, but the concessions 
granted to non-resident subsidiaries and offshore branches of UK resident companies 
under the group relief system do not have application in terms of consortium reliet5. 
A consortium member's 'entitlement' to the losses of a consortium company is dependant 
on the level of its equitable ownership in the consortium company, as well as the 
consortium member's available profit46. In instances where the consortium members 
make losses, the consortium relief would be the lower of the consortium member's actual 
loss, or the portion of the consortium company's profits attributable to the consortium 
4~ Ibid. p. I 8. I 
43 Ibid. p.19.1 
44 Ibid. pp.19.1 and 19.2 
45 Ibid. p.19.2 











member (i.e. this amount is dependant on the extent of the consortium member's interest 
in the consortium compan/\ 
Of significant importance (as highlighted above) is the fact that group relief enjoys 
preference over consortium reliet8• This can best be illustrated in terms of the following 
example: 
Company A owns 80% of company B, which in turn is a consortium company in terms of 
its relationship with company C (company C being a consortium member which owns a 
10% interest in company B). If company B has incurred losses, these losses must first be 
transferred to company A. 10% of the remaining losses would then be capable of being 
transferred to C. 
The consortium relief provisions also make provision for a 'group consortium company'. 
A group consortium company is simply a consortium company which is a holding 
company of a group as contemplated in terms of the group relief system49• The normal 
ranking rules still apply in the sense that group relief must first be applied, after which 
the consortium relief rules (to the extent that the group consortium company still has a 
loss) will be applied5o. Provision is also made for further variations of corporate 
structures in as far as consortium relief is concerned. These are not deemed to be 
relevant for the purposes of this research paper and have therefore not been addressed 
herein. 
~7 Ibid. p. I 9.3 
~8 Ibid. p.19.6 
~9 Ibid. p.20. I 











3.2.3 Intra-group transfers of assets 
Apart from the group relief and consortium relief rules, provision is made in the UK tax 
legislation for roll-over relief in terms of intra-group transfer of assets". This form of 
relief does not form part of the group relief provisions, but nevertheless affords relief in 
terms of intra-group transactions. This regime, prima facie, is similar to the current 
provisions in the Income Tax Act which governs intra-group transactions. 
Transfers of assets between companies who are members of a chargeable gains group are 
subject to roll-over relief in that the tax consequences are deferred until its disposal 
outside of the chargeable gains groupS2. A chargeable gains group would typically 
consist of a principal company and its so-called '75% subsidiaries,s3. A 75% subsidiary 
of a 75% subsidiary would form part of a chargeable gains group, provided that it at least 
qualifies as an 'effective 51 % subsidiary' of the principal companyS-l. The interest held 
by the principal company in its subsidiaries is required to be an equitable ownership (as 
contemplated in the group and consortium relief rules)". 
The aforementioned represent a summary of the provisions relating to group taxation in 
the UK. 
3.2.4 Consolidation and group reliefregimes contrasted 
A quick comparison of a group relief regime and a consolidation regime highlights a 
significant difference in that each company within a group relief regime (as contemplated 
in the UK) retains its own respective status as a taxpayer and would still be required to 
51 Cahiers De Droit Fiscallntemational (2004), page 694 
52 Id. p.694 
53 Ibid. p.695 
54 Id. p.695 











file its own tax return as opposed to the consolidation regime, in which the consolidated 
group is viewed as one entity requiring the filing of one tax return for the entire group. 
The group relief regime as applied in the UK appears to be a very sensible regime and 
appears less complex and easier to apply in practice. It would, at first blush, appear to be 
a regime that should be capable of being introduced into the South African tax legislative 
framework, and should be capable of being adopted by SARS without the need for any 
significant infrastructural and logistical adjustments. 
South African income tax legislation does not permit the transfer of losses in a group of 
companies' scenario. This would however, be possible if a group relief regime was 











Chapter 4: The Margo and Katz Commissions of Inquiry 
Having provided an overview of group taxation in its two most common guises and 
having illustrated how it is applied in the case of Australia and the UK, this chapter will 
focus on the findings of the Margo Commission (in which the debate on group taxation 
and its applicability to South Africa commenced) and the Katz Commission (which 
recommended the introduction of group taxation in South Africa). 
4.1 The Margo Commission 
The main objective of the Margo commission (,"commission") was to investigate and to 
propose appropriate measures aimed at reforming the tax regime in South Africa. It 
appears from the introduction to the commission's report that the reasons giving rise to 
the need for tax reform in South Africa were by and large on all fours with those giving 
rise to the need for tax reform in other countries56• These included the following factors: 
• high inflationary environments; 
• the need to simplify and reform the income tax structure due to it interfering with 
economic choices and retarding saving, investment and growth; 
• the elimination of erosion and leakages of revenue; 
• the redistribution of the overall tax burden to make it fairer, easier and more 
-7 
acceptable; and to foster confidence and respect for the jiscw .... ' . 
Moreover, it is very important to note that the commission was conducted during one of 
the darkest periods of South Africa's socio-political history, i.e. during the era of 
Apartheid. During this period South Africa, as a result of its apartheid policies was faced 
56 Margo Commission, page 3 











with increasing isolation from the international community and had rightly been on the 
receiving end of severe economic and political sanctions imposed by the international 
community. This resulted in large-scale disinvestment from South Africa, which together 
with the imposition of economic sanctions and international trade boycotts, had dire 
consequences for the South African economy. Internally, there was a large-scale political 
uprising against the Nationalist apartheid regime, which included both violent and 
peaceful forms of political protests and activism, as well as industrial action from the 
labour movements in South Africa. These factors were recognised by the commission 
and appear to have been taken into consideration by it58• 
The reforms recommended by the commission should therefore be considered against this 
backdrop. 
Of relevance for the purposes of this thesis however, is that the commission considered in 
detail whether or not a group taxation regime would be appropriate in South Africa, and 
in the final analysis, that it opposed, by a majority vote, the introduction of group taxation 
in South Africa. In arriving at this conclusion, the commission compared the 
consolidation group regime with the Group relief regime (discussed in Chapter 2 and 3 
below), and also considered the arguments for and against the implementation of a 
consolidation group regime59• What follows below is a summary of the aforementioned 
factors as dealt with by the commission6o. 
As a point of departure, the commission accepted that the South African practice of 
taxing each company separately was not necessarily a prevailing general practice in terms 
of other tax jurisdictions and that the representations in favour of group taxation were 
motivated by the belief that group taxation represents a form of tax relief. 
58 Margo Commission, page 2 
59 Ibid. pp. 199 to 202 











The Commission was also in favour of retaining single operating companies in a group as 
opposed to consolidating or merging a group into one unit. 
In determining what would qualify as an appropriate group taxation regime in terms of 
South Africa (had the adoption of group taxation been recommended), the commission 
considered the consolidation and group relief regimes. 
The commission found that the Group relief regime appeared to be favoured over the 
consolidation regime in terms of representations made to it. It was also of the view that 
the perception that the group relief regime was a simpler system than the consolidation 
system only held true at a conceptual level, and felt that the group relief regime caused 
more uncertainty and delays in comparison with the consolidation regime. This was 
based on the view that loss transfers have implications for both transferor and transferee 
companies, and given the time span for making an election (ostensibly on whether or not 
to claim the group relief), various permutations and combinations are brought into the 
equation. Accordingly, the forecasting of future income and profits and in making the 
appropriate choice would require great skill. 
In as far as the consolidation regime is concerned, certain members of the commission 
were of the view that whilst this regime, prima jacie, appeared to be more complex, it in 
fact represented a simpler and a more sound approach to group taxation. The 
commission found that a consolidation exercise could be concluded in a relatively short 
time and without any further uncertainty. The commission appears to have been of the 
view that the consolidation model, coupled with anti-avoidance legislation in terms of 
trafficking in assessed losses, as well as the ring-fencing of a company's assessed losses 
which existed prior to the company forming part of a consolidated group, would be more 
suited to the South African./iscus. 
In deciding whether or not a consolidation group tax regime would be appropriate in a 











implementation. The following are the more salient factors highlighted In these 
arguments: 
4.1. J Arguments in favour of the introduction of the consolidation group tax regime: 
• The lack of a consolidation group tax regIme would gIve nse to large 
divisionalised companies; 
• The lack of such a regime would act as a disincentive towards investing in 
South Africa; 
• Risk-taking would be encouraged as other companies within a group stood to 
gain from losses incurred by the risk-taking company; 
• That it was inherently unfair when one company in a group would be required 
to pay taxes on its profits, in circumstances where the group viewed as one 
economic entity could be in a break-even or loss-making position, with the 
presence of the latter giving rise to capital formation being impaired; 
• That group relief is any event achieved by means of tax planning in terms of 
which income from profitable companies are siphoned off to loss making 
companIes In a group; 
• That the adoption of the consolidation group tax regime would be in line with 
trends in other tax jurisdictions; and 












4.1.2 Arguments against the adoption (?fthe consolidation group tax regime: 
• The adoption of this regime would give rise to a significant loss of revenue to 
thefiscus; 
• The consolidation group tax regime would enable 'tax engineering' by virtue 
of attempting to use ring-fenced assessed losses which arose outside of the 
group; 
• It would foster the trafficking in assessed losses which would require the 
introduction of complex anti-avoidance legislation; 
• The ability to transfer the profits of a profit-making company could prejudice 
the creditors of that company; and 
• The principle that separate legal entities are to be taxed in their own respective 
rights would be undermined. 
As indicated above, the commission ultimately, by a majority vote, opposed the adoption 
of a group taxation regime for South Africa. The minority grouping in the commission, 
who were in favour of the adoption of group taxation, recommended that the adoption 
thereof should be subject to the following: 
• That the group taxation regime should apply in the situation where 
subsidiaries in a group are wholly-owned by the holding company; 
• That only losses arising whilst a company was a subsidiary within a group be 
allowed, with losses existing prior to entry into a group being disallowed; and 
• That there should be strict enforcement of the anti-avoidance legislation to 











Needless to say, the commission's impact (or lack thereof) on group taxation in South 
Africa was that no such taxation regime was adopted or mooted to be adopted in the 
foreseeable future. Notwithstanding this, and more importantly however, was the fact 
that the commission did not dismiss the notion of group taxation out of hand. Instead, it 
chose to consider arguments for and against its suitability for adoption in South Africa. 
In my opinion, the commission at least succeeded in opening the debate on the 
application of group taxation in a South African context and no doubt paved the way for 
debate on this topic to be revisited at a later stage. 
Whilst proponents favouring group taxation may have debated the merits or demerits of 
the Margo Commission's ultimate stance on this topic, no further official debate or 
comment appears to have been made on this topic. That was the case at least until the 
commissioning of the Katz Commission ofinquiry. 
4.2 The Katz Commission 
The Katz Commission ("the commission"), as in the case of the Margo Commission, was 
tasked with recommending means and ways of transforming the tax regime in South 
Africa. Of great importance however, is the fact that the prevailing atmosphere in South 
Africa at the time of the commissioning of the commission stood in stark contrast to the 
conditions prevailing at the time of the Margo commission. South Africa had become a 
non-racial, multi-party democracy with the fall of the Apartheid regime and was granted 
re-entry into the fold of the international community. Moreover, armed with the 
charismatic and inspirational leadership of the Honourable (former) President Nelson 
Mandela, who mesmerised international political and business leaders with his sheer 
presence and charisma, South Africa became an enticing prospect, especially for the 
international business community who were eager to explore trading opportunities and 
business operations in South Africa, and also due to having been persuaded by the 
Honourable President Mandela to do so. South Africa became the so-called 'flavour of 











established democracy in South Africa, the acceptance of the legitimacy of its 
government (and consequently its right to collect taxes), the knowledge that the fruits of 
economic growth should be shared across the South African spectrum, the need for the 
alleviation of abject poverty (a state in which the majority of South Africans found 
themselves), and the new logistical demands and global competition (as a direct result of 
South Africa's re-entry into the international arena), had to be taken into account in 
formulating its recommendations in terms of the South African tax structure61 • 
However, whilst South Africa had made significant political strides and whilst the South 
African economy had commenced its journey on a path of growth (albeit fairly slow), its 
tax legislation lacked the necessary level of sophistication to keep up with these 
developments. 
It is these developments which contributed towards the constitution of the commission. 
From November 1994, the commission released a series of reports in terms of which its 
recommendations on various areas of taxation were aired. Of relevance for the purposes 
of this research paper is the Third Interim Report of the Katz Commission. In this 
report62 , the commission clearly expresses the view that South Africa, from a group 
taxation perspective had fallen behind in its tax treatment of groups of companies in 
comparison with its international counterparts and that South Africa could ill-afford to 
lag-behind in terms of the manner in which it taxed corporate groups. In arriving at its 
recommendation, the commission considered the advantages and disadvantages of group 
taxation, debated which regime (i.e. the consolidation regime or the group relief regime) 
was more suitable from a South African perspective, how group taxation should be 
introduced, and what the mechanics of this preferred group taxation regime should be63 • 
61 Katz Commission (I), Pages 7 to 8 
62 Katz Commission (3), pages 96 to III 











The following are the advantages and disadvantages of group taxation from the 
commission's perspective64 : 
4.2. J Advantages: 
• A closely held group of companies would be viewed as a single economic unit 
under a group taxation regime. A tax system that fails to take cognisance of this 
reality would in all likelihood create economic and business distortions, for 
example, the divisionalisation of companies into one legal entity purely for tax 
reasons (which has the effect of denying the companies protection of limited 
liability in terms of company law). Where companies are unable to divisionalise 
as a result of legal or strategic reasons, it could give rise to complex intra-group 
transactions (aimed purely at avoiding or reducing the company's tax liability) 
which could also be lacking in commercial substance, such as transfer pricing or 
excessive management fees. The existence of an appropriate group taxation 
regime would avoid the need for these artificial types of transactions. Moreover, 
should such transactions be entered into, a full audit trail would be available to 
the revenue authorities were a suitable group taxation regime to be in operation; 
• Group taxation facilitates the unbundling of large corporate groups into more 
efficient group company structures. The commission was of the view that these 
types of unbundling exercises could result in the unbundled companies incurring 
higher tax liabilities as a result of increased profits; and 
• Foreign investors would have expectations in terms of the existence of some 
form of group taxation in South Africa. 












• Depending on its nature, a group taxation regime could potentially be very 
complex; 
• Again, depending on its nature, it is perceived to be costly from the perspective 
of the fisclIs; and 
• The existence of a group taxation regIme could gIve nse to the need for 
additional anti-avoidance legislation. 
The commission felt that the disadvantages highlighted by the Margo Commission had 
doubtful validity in the first place or had since fallen away, and therefore did not feel the 
need to highlight them. 
By stating that it would be appropriate to introduce a compromised form of group 
taxation that would not be complex nor costly and would be capable of evolving into a 
fully fledged group taxation regime, the commission implied that the disadvantages 
highlighted were not sufficiently serious to militate against the adoption of an appropriate 
group taxation regime. 
The commission also expressed its preference for the consolidation group taxation regime 
as opposed to the group relief regime. In this regard, the commission advanced the 
following reasons: 
• The group relief regime does very little In terms of the recognition of the 
economic unit of a corporate group; 
• The group relief regime potentially creates an environment for the manipulation 
of intra-group transactions, engineering timing differences, manipulating cost 











that such manipulations would not have any impact in terms of the consolidation 
regime; 
• The consolidation regime represented what a group taxation regime should be, 
whereas the group relief was precisely that, a 'group relief regime and not a 
group taxation regime; and 
• The group relief regime is potentially far more complex than the consolidation 
regime, due to the latter being a more flexible regime and due to the difficulties 
created as a result of the time span involved in making an election in terms of the 
group relief regime. 
4.2.3 The Commission's view on whether or not group tax should be adopted in South 
Africa 
In order to minimise the impact of factors such as cost and complexity, the commission 
recommended that a gradual approach be adopted in terms of introducing a consolidation-
type group taxation regime in South Africa. The commission found that claims to the 
effect that the jiscus would incur substantial losses during the transition to a group 
taxation regime, were either exaggerated or unsubstantiated and that any potential cost to 
the jiscus could be substantially mitigated by excluding losses of a company prior to it 
becoming part of a consolidated group, and that the fiscus actually stood to lose more in 
terms of the tax regime as it then was (as groups with both profit and loss-making 
companies were able to avoid paying tax, as it could manipulate its tax exposure in the 
form of artificial intra-group transactions), as opposed to what it could lose in terms of a 
group taxation regime. 
The commission also forwarded a proposal in terms of the mechanics of the 
recommended consolidation group taxation regime and how it should be phased in. In 
line with the proposal that the group taxation regime should be introduced gradually, the 











regime. A detailed discussion of the proposed regime is not required for the purposes of 
this research paper. Instead, a summary of the highlights of the regime proposed by the 
commission are provided below. 
In this regard, David Clegg65 accurately provided a summary of the commission's 
recommendations in terms of the introduction of a consolidation group taxation regime as 
involving the following mechanism: 
• A group of companies is to be determined on the basis of wholly-owned 
subsidiaries. Excluded from this holding were shares held by employees which 
did not exceed 10% of a company's equity capital; 
• That group taxation would apply on an elective basis in terms of the entire group. 
Companies acquired into or disposed of from a group would enter or exit at the 
commencement or end of their first or last wholly-owned period; 
• The ring-fencing of existing assessed losses brought forward as at the 
commencement date of group taxation in the instance of a particular group; 
• Each company's own 'sub-return' (i.e. each company within the group) was to be 
based on the normal tax principles but would then be adjusted by the calculation 
of the capital allowances based on the original cost to the group, the reversal of 
section 24 or 24C allowances (in terms of the Income Tax Act) and bad debt 
allowances on intra-group transactions, and the reversal of group unrealised 
profits and losses on trading stock transfers between companies within the group; 
• The current taxable income in terms of the 'sub-returns' (before taking into 
account assessed losses brought forward) would then be 'contributed' to the 
65 A well-respected South African tax practitioner, author and commentator and recently-retired partner of 












consolidated return for set-otT against the current year losses of the other group 
companies (on a pro-rata or election basis); and 
• The taxable income of a company which has not been contributed (i.e. absorbed 
by a current year loss) from a sub-return to a consolidated return could then be 
used for set-off against a prior year's assessed loss in terms of that company. Any 
balance of assessed loss in that company (after set-of\) would however remain 
ring-fenced for the following year and therefore not available for set-off in terms 
of the consolidation. A company's current year losses that has not been set-off by 
the consolidated taxable income of the group, is also ring-fenced and carried 
forward in that company, as opposed to being carried forward as a consolidated 
10ss66. 
The decision by the Katz Commission to recommend the adoption of group taxation was 
not surprising. The Margo Commission had commenced the debate on the viability of 
group taxation in South Africa, but decided against recommending its adoption as it 
ultimately was of the view that it was not suitable in the prevailing environment (from a 
socio-political and economic perspective) in South Africa at the time. Due to the 
changed socio-economic and political environment at the time of the Katz Commission, 
as well as the developments internationally from an economic perspective, and having 
had the debate on group taxation previously opened by the Margo Commission, the Katz 
Commission was able to take a more favourable view on group taxation, which resulted 
in it recommending the adoption of group taxation in South Africa, albeit in terms of a 
gradual approach. 
The Katz Commission's approach, in my opinion, had merit as it would have enabled the 
National Treasury and the South African Revenue Service ("SARS"), (given the 
administrative and logistical constraints within which they operated in), to gradually put 
into operation the necessary processes and procedures required to successfully implement 
group taxation. From thereon, in line with the Katz Commission's recommendations, the 











group taxation regime could gradually have been adapted and modified until it eventually 
operated as a fully-functional and effective consolidation group taxation regime. 
Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Katz Commission in this regard, it would 
appear that the recommendations in terms of the adoption of group taxation have been 
largely ignored, as to date, no such regime has been adopted or implemented in South 
Africa. 
The developments in terms of the taxation of companies and groups of companies in 
South Africa subsequent to the recommendations of the Katz Commission will now be 
considered to ascertain whether or not any of the recommendations of the Katz 
Commission have been included in the Income Tax Act, or whether or not any elements 











Chapter 5: Developments subsequent to the Katz Commission 
This chapter will examine to what extent any of the Katz Commission's 
recommendations in terms of the taxation of corporate groups or groups of companies 
have found their way into the Income Tax Act. Furthermore, given that the Third 
Interim report of the Katz Commission was published in December 1995, only 
developments subsequent to this will be considered. 
An examination of the legislative changes from 1996 onwards confirms that no group 
taxation regime was introduced by National Treasury. The most significant development 
(other than the introduction of capital gains tax C"CGT") with effect from I October 
2001) was the introduction of the corporate rules to the Income Tax Act in terms of the 
Second Revenue Laws Amendment Act of 2001 67 C"the 200 I Amendment Ace), and its 
amendment in terms of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act of 200268 (""the 2002 
Amendment Act"). The aim of the corporate rules is to allow the transfer of assets with 
limited taxation consequences, and to be of application in transactions between group 
companies and between founding shareholders and their companies69• 
It appears that the introduction of the corporate rules in terms of the 200 I Amendment 
Act was in response to the introduction of CGT and not as a result of the 
recommendations of the Katz Commission on group taxation. This is apparent from the 
IFA's commentary, as its studies found that the South African tax legislation (subsequent 
to the advent of CGT) were inadequate in the context of corporate restructures as it was 
not able to adequately cater for the adverse CGT consequences triggered in a 
reorganisation of companies within a group of companies7o. More specifically, the 
potential cascading effect of CGT in respect of multi-tier groups of companies was not 
67 No.60 of2001 
68 No.74 of2002 
69 Huxham and Haupt, page 304 











catered for71 • The tax legislation, prior to the introduction of the corporate rules, had the 
effect that the transfer of assets between companies would represent a separate CGT 
event, and accordingly, a reorganisation, in the context of a multi-tier group of companies 
would lead to a multiplicity of CGT events, each event attracting CGT in respect of one 
d· IT' Isposa -. 
5.1 The 2001 Amendment Act 
The 200 I Amendment Act introduced CGT roll-over relief provisions, which also 
included income tax roll-over relief (with reference to recoupment of certain allowances 
in terms of the disposal of assets) and in particular introduced relief in terms of the 
transactions highlighted below. Please note that the explanations of these transactions are 
high-level explanations and unless otherwise stated, provide a high-level description of 
these transactions as provided for in the 200 I Amendment Act. A more detailed and 
current description of the implications of these transactions in terms of the corporate rules 
(i.e. as they currently appear in the Income Tax Act) will be addressed in Chapter 6 
below. The transactions envisaged in terms of the corporate rules were the following: 
• Company formations - These related to transactions in terms which one person, 
(referred to as the transferor) disposed of an asset to a company that was a 
resident, (referred to as the transferee), in exchange for equity shares in that 
transferee company, and in terms of which the transferor would have acquired a 
qualifying share (i.e. a minimum shareholding) in that transferee company; 
• Share-for-share transactions - These related to transactions in which a person (the 
transferor) disposed of an equity share in a company to a resident company (the 
transferee), in exchange for equity shares in the transferee company, subject to the 
transferor holding a qualifying share in the transferee company; 
71 Id. p.596; Explanatory Memorandum to the 2001 Act 











• Transfers between group companies (intra-group transactions) - These related to 
transactions in which a company (the transferor) disposed of an asset to another 
company (the transferee), and in circumstances where both companies were part 
of the same group of companies; 
• Unbundling transactions - These related to transactions in tenns of which an 
unbundling company disposed of its interest in a resident company ("the 
unbundled company') to its shareholder(s) (which could include the unbundling 
company's holding company); and 
• Transactions relating to liquidation, winding-up and deregistration - These 
transactions involved the disposal by a liquidating company of its asset(s) to its 
holding company. 
All of these transactions provided various fonns of roll-over relief mainly from a CGT 
perspective, but also included in certain instances, exemptions and/or roll-over relief 
from Income Tax, Marketable Securities Tax, Uncertificated Securities Tax, Stamp 
Duties (the latter three as they then were), Donations' Tax and Secondary Company's 
tax. Furthennore, in an attempt to combat the exploitation of loop-holes in these 
provisions, the 200 I Amendment Act also proposed various anti-avoidance measures 
which were to apply to the corporate rules. The effect of the roll-over relief was that it 
deferred any potential CGT liability, with such potential CGT liability arising in the 
transferee's hands. 
The effect and impact of the 200 I Amendment Act had hardly been digested when the 
corporate rules were refined and amended in terms of the 2002 Amendment Act. The 
significant features of the 2002 Amendment Act in tenns of the corporate rules were that 
a new section dealing with amalgamation transactions was introduced and that company 
fonnation transactions, intra-group transactions and liquidations, winding-ups and de-











Act had already made provision for the transferor and transferee companies to jointly 
elect that the roll-over relief was to apply to an intra-group transaction.) 
5.2 The 2002 Amendment Act 
The provisions relating to amalgamation transactions introduced in terms of the 2002 
Amendment Act applied in terms of transactions where a company (the amalgamated 
company) disposed of all its assets to a resident company, in terms of a merger, an 
amalgamation or a conversion, which would result in the amalgamated company's 
existence being terminated. In as far as the elections in terms of the company-formation 
transactions, intra-group transactions and liquidation transactions were concerned, the 
following should be noted: 
• Company-formation and Intra-group transactions - The 2002 Amendment Act 
made provision for the transferor and transferee to make a joint election on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis, for the company-formation provisions and the 
intra-group provisions to apply thereto; 
• The election in terms of liquidations, winding-ups and de-registrations was 
required to be made jointly by all the parties to the transaction and had to apply 
to all the assets transferred in terms of the transaction; and 
• By not inserting any election provISIons In terms of share-for-share 
transactions, amalgamation transactions and unbundling transactions, the 
implication thereof was that the roll-over relief in terms of these transactions 
applied automatically, and were, as the IFA puts it, mandatory provisions73 • 











5.3 Subsequent Amendments 
The corporate rules were subsequently subjected to various amendments and refinements, 
with the most notable being: 
(i) The combining of the sections dealing with company-formation transactions 
and share-for-share transactions into one section entitled 'asset-for-share 
• ,74 d transactIons ; an 
(ii) The narrowing of the definition of a 'group of companies' to apply only to 
South African resident groups of companies, who were able to qualify for the 
roll-over reliefin terms of the corporate rules. The implications of the corporate 
rules will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 6. 
Whilst legislative amendments since 1996 were only looked at for the purposes of this 
discussion, it stands to be mentioned that the Taxation Laws Amendment Act of 198875 
introduced provisions which exempted from transfer duty and stamp duty the transfer of 
property or shares between companies who were members of the same group of 
companies, in circumstances where such transfer took place in terms of the rationalisation 
of companies and which had occurred within the period commencing on 17 June 1988 
and ending on 30 June 200 I. 
This legislation appears to have been the first provision introduced that had elements of 
group tax therein. 
74 In tenns of amendments introduced by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No.35 of 2007, the Revenue 
Laws Amendment Act No.60 of2008 and the Taxation Laws Amendment Act No.3 of2008 











Chapter 6: The Corporate Rules and Group Taxation 
Having established that a group taxation regime in the classical sense (as highlighted in 
chapter 2) has not been introduced in South Africa, the objective of this chapter, as well 
as the following chapter, is to highlight to what extent the South African tax legislation 
makes provision for relief that could possibly be ascribed to group taxation principles or 
which could possibly be construed as having certain elements or characteristics of a 
group taxation regime. In this regard, reference will be made to the Income Tax Act, the 
Value Added Tax Act76, the Securities Transfer Tax Act77 and the Transfer Duty Ace8• 
This chapter will address the implications of the corporate rules and highlight any aspects 
thereof which display any group taxation characteristics. The remaining provisions of the 
Income Tax Act which could be seen to display certain characteristics of group taxation, 
as well as similar provisions in the Value-Added Tax Act, the Securities Transfer Tax 
Act and the Transfer Duty Act, will be addressed in Chapter 7. 
The Income Tax Act contains a number of provisions which provide relief to group 
companies and in certain instances provides relief for the founding shareholders of a 
company and the company itself, the most significant of which are set-out in sections 41 
to 47 of Part III of the Income Tax Act. 
Section 41 is a general provision and provides the definitions of entities and terms 
referred to in sections 42 to 47. Sections 42 to 47 contain the provisions relating to asset-
for-share transactions, amalgamation transactions, intra-group transactions, unbundling 
transactions and transactions relating to liquidations, windings-up and deregistrations, 
respectively. 
It is submitted that as the corporate rules, viewed as a taxation regime, are the closest to 
what could be considered as a group taxation regime, a more in depth discussion thereof 
76 No.89 of 1991 
77 No.25 of 2007 











is warranted. The following addresses the tax implications of the corporate rules, but 
does not however, represent an exhaustive discussion thereof. Only the aspects deemed 
necessary for the purposes of this research paper have been addressed. 
6.1 Section 41 
In the context of section 41, terms which have been defined in section 1 of the Income 
Tax Act are in certain instances subject to further definition in the sense that the section 
41 definition would be more restrictive. 
An example of this is the definition of a 'group of companies'. The section 1 definition 
includes foreign groups whereas the section 41 definition only applies to South African 
resident groups. A glance at the section I and section 41 definitions of a 'group of 
companies' as they currently appear in the Income Tax Act demonstrates such restriction. 
6.1.1 A 'group of companies' 
A 'group of companies' is defined in section 1 as follows: 
"../ "group of companies" means two or more companies in which one company (hereinajier 
referred to as the "controlling group company") directly or indirectly holds shares in at least one 
other company (hereinafter referred to as the "controlled group company"'j, to the extent that . 
(a) at least 70 per cent of the equity shares of each controlled group company are directly 
held by the controlling group company, one or more other controlled group companies or 
any combination thereof; and 
(b) the controlling group company directly holds at least 70 per cent of the equity shares in 
at least one controlled group company. " 
Included in the section 1 definition of a 'company' are resident and non-resident 
companies and it therefore includes both South African resident groups and international 











The section 41 'group of companies' definition however excludes non-resident 
companies79• The relevance of this is that any relief relating to a group of companies in 
terms of the corporate rules would only have application to South African groups of 
companies. This restricted approach is as a result of a recent amendment to the Income 
Tax Act and has only been of application since 21 February 2008. 
6.1.2 Other important provisions 
Another important provision in terms of section 41 is that the corporate rules (i.e. sections 
41 to 47) override the normal tax rules as provided for in the Income Tax Act other than 
the provisions of section 24B(2) and 24B(3) (transactions where assets are acquired in 
exchange for shares issued), the general anti-avoidance provisions in terms of sections 
80A to 80 L, and the provisions of section 103 (the anti-avoidance provision in terms of 
assessed losses)so with these provisions enjoying precedence over the corporate rulesS]. 
Whilst section 41 contains many other definitions, a discussion thereof is not required for 
the purposes hereof. The implications of sections 42, 44, 45, 46 and 47 of the Income 
Tax Act which require closer scrutiny will now be addresseds2. 
6.2 Asset-for-share transactions 
Asset-for-share transactions are governed in terms of the provisions of section 42 of the 
Income Tax Act. Share-for-share transactions which were previously governed by the 
provisions of section 43 are with effect from I January 2007, also governed in terms of 
7q Subparagraph (ee) of the section 41 definition ofa 'group of companies' 
80 A discussion on these provisions is not relevant for the purposes hereof 
81 Section 41(2) of the Income Tax Act; Huxham and Haupt, 2009, page 309 
81 The implications of section 46A, which provides for the limitation of costs applicable to unbundling 











the provisions of section 42 ('the asset-for-share provisions'). The aspects deemed to be 
the most significant aspects of this section have been expanded upon below. 
6.2. J General Requirements 
An asset-for-share transaction envisages the disposal of an asset by a person (a natural 
person or a company (the transferor» to a South African resident company (the 
transferee) in exchange for equity shares in the transferee. In addition, the asset-for-share 
provisions require that a transferor company must hold a qualifying interest in the 
transferee company at the end of the day on which the asset is disposed of. 
A 'qualifying interest' in the context of an unlisted company involves the transferor 
holding at least 20% of the equity shares and the voting rights of a transferee company or 
holding an equity share in a company forming part of the same group of companies as the 
transferee companl3• A 'qualifying interest' in a listed company involves the transferor 
holding an equity share in that transferee companl-l. 
The asset-for-share provisions require that a capital asset acquired by the transferee must 
be treated as a capital asset85, and an acquisition of trading stock must be treated as 
trading stock86• An exception to this rule applies where the transferor and transferee are 
not part of the same group of companies, with the transferee being permitted to treat a 
capital asset acquired as trading stock87• 
83 Subparagraphs (c) and (d) of the definition of a 'qualifYing interest' as provided for in section 42( 1) 
8-1 Subparagraph (a) of the definition of a 'qualifying interest' as provided for in section 42( I) 
85 Section 42( I )(b )(ii) 
86 Section 42(1)(b)(i) 











The provisions of section 42 apply automatically on an asset-by-asset basis unless the 
transferor and transferee jointly elect that it should not appll8. 
6.2.2 Roll-over relief 
It is important to note that a capital asset will be deemed to be transferred at its base cost, 
thereby not giving rise to any capital gains tax implications for the transferor89. At the 
same time, the transferor's base cost in the equity shares acquired in the transferee 
company would be equal to the base cost of the asset disposed of to the transferee90 • 
Furthermore, the transferee's base cost of a capital asset acquired from the transferor 
would be that of the transferor's91, and the transferee's tax cost of trading stock acquired 
from the transferor would also be that of the transferor'sn. The transferee company 
effectively steps into the shoes of the transferor company in terms of the asset transferred. 
This also applies to allowances claimable under section 24C in respect of contracts where 
a business is transferred as a going concern 93. In the case of capital assets in terms of 
which allowances have been claimed, no recoupments would be recognised in the 
transferor's hands and the transferee would be entitled to claim any future allowances 
thereon, if still applicable94. 
The section 42 relief only applies to the extent that assets are transferred in exchange for 
shares. Apportionment rules apply if additional consideration, other than in the form of 
shares, is forwarded to a transferor95. 
88 Section 42(8A)(a) 
89 Section 42(2)(a)(i) read together with section 42(1 )(a)(i) 
90 Section 42(2)(a)(ii)(bb) 
9\ Section 42(2)(b)(ii)(aa) 
9~ Section 42(2)(b)(ii)(bb) 
93 Section 42(3)(c) 
94 Section 42(3)(a) and (b) 











6.2.3 Anti-Avoidance provisions 
Section 42 contains anti-avoidance provisions designed to combat abuse thereof and are 
triggered in the following instances: 
• Where a transferor ceases to hold a qualifying interest in a transferee company 
within 18 months after the conclusion of an asset-for-share transaction (other than 
in terms of an intra-group transaction, an unbundling transaction, a liquidation, 
winding-up or deregistration ("transactions in terms of the corporate rules") or in 
terms of an involuntary disposal), a deemed disposal and re-acquisition of the 
transferor's remaining interest in the transferee company is triggered, thereby 
giving rise to a CGT liability to the transferor96; 
• Where the transferor disposes of an equity share in the transferee within 18 
months after the conclusion of an asset-for-share transaction (other than 
transactions in terms of the corporate rules), the equity share disposed of could (in 
certain instances) be treated as the disposal of trading stock97 ; 
• Where the transferee company disposes of a capital asset within 18-months from 
the conclusion of an asset-for-share transaction, ring-fencing rules would apply to 
a portion of any resultant capital gain or loss 98; 
• The ring-fencing rules would also apply to a portion of any recoupment of 
allowances arising on the disposal of a capital asset within the aforementioned 18-
month period99 and to any profit realised on the disposal of trading stock within 
96 Section 42(6) 
q7 Section 42(5) 
98 Section 42(7)(a) 











the 18-month period, unless the trading stock is of the same kind or equivalent 
quality as the trading stock it regularly and continuously sells 1oo• 
6.2.4 The existence of any group taxation provisions in section 42 
Whilst section 42 provides roll-over relief in terms of the disposal of an asset in exchange 
for shares, the relief is not of a permanent nature and has the effect of deferring or 
delaying the triggering of a taxable event. Furthermore, whilst this relief is similar to that 
afforded to group companies in a consolidation model (such as the Australian 
consolidation model which ignores the transfer of assets between group companies) it is 
not a classical form of group taxation relief, as the existence of a group of companies is 
not a prerequisite for the application of section 42. In addition, the provisions apply 
automatically on an asset-by-asset basis, but the transferor and the transferee company 
can jointly elect for the asset-for-share provision not to apply to the transfer of an asset. 
An election on this basis does not appear to be consistent with the principle of group 
taxation, again for example, such as in the case of Australia, where the group taxation 
rules apply automatically (after the group has elected for the consolidation group taxation 
to apply to it) and are not capable of being elected out of. It is an all-or-nothing 
approach. Section 42 does however accord a transferor forming part of the same group of 
companies an advantage in that it would meet the requirement of holding a qualifying in 
interest in circumstances where it holds an equity share in a company forming part of the 
same group of companies as the transferee company. On the other hand, a transferee not 
being a member of the same group of companies as the transferor would have the option 
of treating a capital asset acquired as a capital asset or as trading stock. 
A further group taxation-type relief is that the disposal of an asset or of an equity share in 
circumstances which would normally trigger the section 42 anti-avoidance provisions, are 
relaxed where the disposal is in terms of an intra-group transaction, an unbundling 
transaction or a liquidation transaction. Intra-group transactions, unbundling transactions 
100 Section 42(7)(b)(i) read together with paragraph (b) of the section 41 definition of 'trading stock·; 











and liquidation transactions accord roll-over relief in a 'group of companies' scenario 
(although an unbundling transaction is permitted to take place where the shareholder is a 
listed company or in unlisted unbundlings to group companies). 
Section 42 does therefore contain certain group tax-related provisions, albeit that it is not 
intended to provide relief in a 'group of companies only scenario'. 
6.3 Amalgamation transactions 
6.3.1 General Requirements 
Amalgamation transactions are governed by the provisions of section 44 of the Income 
Tax Act. It involves an amalgamation, conversion or merger of a company (the 
amalgamated company) in terms of which the amalgamated company disposes of all its 
assets (except those required to settle its trade debts) to a South African resident company 
(the resultant company) in exchange for equity shares in the resultant company or by the 
assumption of debt by the resultant company and in terms of which the amalgamated 
company's existence is terminated lOl . The termination of the amalgamated company's 
existence involves the liquidation, deregistration or wind up of the amalgamated 
company coupled with the distribution in specie of the shares in the resultant company to 
the shareholder of the amalgamated company. As in the case of the discussion of section 
42, the aspects deemed to be the most significant aspects of this section have been 
expanded upon below. 
The shareholder of an amalgamated company is required to hold a qualifying interest in 
the resultant company where equity shares in the resultant company have been distributed 
by an amalgamated company to its shareholder in terms of the liquidation, deregistration 
or wind up transaction of the amalgamated companylO2. 
101 Section 44(1 )(a) reads together with section 44(4) 











The definition of a 'qualifying interest' In terms of an amalgamation transaction IS 
similar to the section 42 definition with the only difference being that an equity share in a 
company forming part of the same group of companies is not included in the section 44 
definition 103. 
Section 44 applies automatically in the context of the disposal of an asset by the 
amalgamated company to the resultant company unless the holding company of the 
amalgamated company and the resultant company form part of the same group of 
companies and these three companies jointly elect for it not to applyl04. 
There are two events which reqUIre consideration In terms of an amalgamation 
transaction, namely: 
• The transfer by the amalgamated company of all its assets in exchange for equity 
shares in the resultant company; and 
• The disposal of the shares in the amalgamated company and the transfer of the 
shares in the resultant company from the amalgamated company to its holding 
company. 
6.3.2 Transfer of assets by the amalgamated company in exchange jiJr shares in the 
resultant company in terms of an amalgamation transaction 
6.3.2.1 Roll-over relief 
Where the amalgamated company transfers its assets to the resultant company in 
exchange for shares in the resultant company, the following roll-over relief implications 
apply: 
IOJ As defined in Section 44( I). The section 42 definition of a "qualifYing interest' is set-out in paragraph 
6.2.1 above 











• An asset transferred as a capital asset and treated by the resultant company as a 
capital asset, is transferred at its base costlO5; 
• Trading stock acquired by the resultant company as trading stock is transferred at 
its tax value lO6; and 
• In the case of capital assets in terms of which allowances have been claimed and 
would be claimable, no recoupments would be recognised in the transferor's 
hands and the resultant company would be entitled to claim any future 
allowances, if still applicable lO7 108. 
The roll-over relief also applies to allowances claimed (and claimable) under section 24C 
in respect of contracts where a business is transferred as a going concem lO9. The 
aforementioned reliefs are all based on the fact that the resultant company effectively 
steps into the shoes of the transferor company. 
The tax implications are virtually identical to the transfer of assets in the context of an 
'asset-for-share' transaction with the only difference being that section 42 enables the 
transferee in a group of companies scenario to elect whether to treat a capital asset 
transferred to it as a capital asset or as trading stock. 
\05 Section 44(2)(a) 
106 Section 44(2)(b) 
107 Section 44(3 )(aXi) 
108 Section 44(3 )(aXii) 











6.3.2.2 Anti-Avoidance provisions 
Section 44 also has certain anti-avoidance provisions which could be triggered upon the 
disposal of the assets acquired by a resultant company from an amalgamated company 
within 18 months of the conclusion of the amalgamation transaction. In this regard, the 
following would be applicable: 
• Ring-fencing rules would apply to a portion of any capital gain or loss arising as a 
result of the disposal of a capital asset by a resultant company 110 III; 
• The disposal by the resultant company of trading stock would result in any profits 
or losses in terms of such disposal being ring-fenced 112; and 
• Similarly, ring-fencing rules also apply to a portion of any recoupment arising on 
the disposal by the resultant company of a capital asset (in respect of which 
capital allowances could be claimed) 113. 
6.3.3 Disposal of shares in the amalgamated company and the transfer of shares in the 
resultant companyfrom the amalgamated company to its holding company 
6.3.3. J Roll-over relief 
The section 44 roll-over relief will only apply provided the amalgamated company has 
taken steps within 18 months after the date of the amalgamation transaction, to liquidate, 
110 Section 44(5 )(a) 
III Section 44(5)(a)(ii), also Huxham and Haupt, 2009, page 318 
II~ Section 44(5)(b)(i) 











wind up or deregister or has not done anything which prevents its liquidation, winding-up 
d . . r. k· I 114 or ereglstratlon .rom ta mg pace . 
Roll-over relief also applies where the amalgamated company's holding company 
disposes of its interest in the amalgamated company (as part of its liquidation, wind up or 
deregistration), and in tum acquires equity shares in the resultant company either as 
capital assets or trading stock, and holds a qualifying interest in the resultant company I 15. 
The holding company is deemed to have disposed of its equity shares in the amalgamated 
company at the base cost (or at the tax cost) thereof and to have acquired the equity 
shares in the resultant company at that same base cost (or tax cost), depending on whether 
the shares in the amalgamated company were disposed of and the shares in the resultant 
company were acquired as capital assets or as trading stock, as the case may be 116• 
Accordingly, no CGT or income tax consequences would arise. The shares in the 
amalgamated company are effectively replaced with shares in the resultant company. 
Furthermore, acquisition by the holding company of the shares in the resultant company 
in terms of a distribution in specie from the amalgamated company, is deemed not to be a 
dividendi 17. 
6.3.3.2 Anti-Avoidance provision 
Where the holding company ceases to hold a qualirying interest in the resultant company 
within 18 months after the conclusion of an amalgamation transaction (other than 
transactions in terms of the corporate rules or in terms of an involuntary disposal), a 
II~ Section 44( 13) 
115 Section 44(6); the definition of a 'qualifying interest' is set-out in paragraph 6.2.1 above 
lib Section 44(6)(b)(i),(ii) and (iii) and section 44(6)(c) 











deemed disposal and re-acquisition of the holding company's remaining interest in the 
resultant company is triggered 118. 
6.3.4 The existence of any group taxation provisions in section 44 
As in the instance of section 42, section 44 provides roll-over relief in terms of the 
transfer of assets and shares (similar to those granted in terms of international group 
taxation principles), but there appears little, if any, group taxation relief to parties to an 
amalgamation transaction. 
The types of relief that would normally apply in the case of a group are present, but the 
availability of the section 44 relief is not dependent on the existence of a group of 
companies. In this regard, the distribution in specie by an amalgamated company of its 
interest in a resultant company to its holding company or shareholder, as the case may be 
is relevant. The relief accorded in this instance is that the distribution would not give rise 
to any STC in the amalgamated company's hands and would not be recognised as the 
accrual of a dividend in the holding company's or the shareholder's hands. This relief is 
also not dependant on the existence of a group of companies. 
Where the resultant company and the shareholder or holding company of the 
amalgamated company are part of the same group of companies an election for the 
provisions of section 44 not to apply could be made. This, it is submitted cannot be 
construed as being a group taxation relief. 
Save therefore for the presence of roll-over relief on the transfer of assets and shares, 
section 44, it is submitted, does not contain any provisions that can be ascribed to a group 
taxation regime. 











6.4 Intra-group transactions 
Intra-group transactions are governed in terms of the provisions of section 45 of the 
Income Tax Act. The following are deemed the most significant provisions of section 45. 
6..J.1 General Requirements 
An intra-group transaction involves the transfer of an asset by one company (the 
transferor company) to a South African resident company (the transferee company) 
where both companies at the end of the day on which the transaction is concluded, form 
part of the same group of companies 119. The intra-group transaction provisions apply 
automatically unless the transferor and transferee companies jointly elect for the 
. . f . 45 I PO provIsIons 0 sectIon not to app y - . 
6.4.2 Roll-Over relief 
The section 45 roll-over relief rules in terms of the following transfers are a mirror image 
of the roll-over relief provisions as discussed in terms of the rules applicable to 
I · . PI ama gamatlOn transactions - : 
• The transfer of an asset held as a capital asset by the transferor company to the 
transferee company who acquires it as a capital asset l22 ; 
• The transfer of an asset held as trading stock by the transferor company to the 
transferee company who acquires it as trading stock l23 ; 
119 Section 45 
120 Section 45(6 )(g) 
121 As set-out on paragraph 6.3.2.1 above 
122 Section 45(2)(a) 











• The transfer of an asset held as a capital asset (in tenns of which capital 
allowances could be claimed) by the transferor company to the transferee 
company who acquires the capital asset on the same basisl2.l; and 
• The transfer of a business as a gomg concern where allowances have been 
claimed or are claimable under section 24CI25. 
6.4.3 Anti-Avoidance provisions 
Anti-avoidance provisions apply where a transferee company degroups from the group of 
companies in tenns of which it and the transferor company belong to, as well as in 
instances where the asset acquired by a transferee company is disposed of within 18 
months after the conclusion of the intra-group transaction. 
Where a transferee company has acquired an asset in terms of an intra-group transaction 
and ceases to fonn part of the same group of companies as the transferor company within 
a period of 6 years after the intra-group transaction, the following section 45 degrouping 
provisions would be triggered: 
• In the case of an asset held as a capital asset, the degrouping would result in the 
deemed disposal and re-acquisition by the transferee company of that asset l26; 
• In the case of an asset held as a capital asset (in respect of which allowances could 
be claimed), degrouping would give rise to the recoupment of the allowances 
previously claimed in the transferee company's hands 127; and 
1~4 Section 45(3 )(a) 
1~5 Section 45(3)(b) 
1~6 Section 45(4)(b)(i) 











• In the case of an asset held as trading stock, the degrouping provisions would give 
rise to a deemed sale and re-acquisition of the trading stockJ28. 
No degrouping arises In the case of the liquidation, wind up or deregistration of a 
transferor or transferee company, where the holding company holds at least 70% of the 
equity shareholding of the company subject to the liquidation, wind up or 
d 
. . 1"9 
ereglstratlon - . 
In addition, where an asset acquired in terms of an intra-group transaction is disposed of 
within 18 months of the intra-group transaction, the anti-avoidance provisions as 
discussed in terms of the amalgamation transactions would apply, and the tax 
implications which arise in the hands of the resultant company would equally apply to the 
transferee company in the intra-group transaction scenario 130. 
6...f...f The existence of any group taxation provisions in section 45 
Section 45 is the one section in the Income Tax Act which comes closest to a group 
taxation type provision. The reason for this being that the section 45 relief provisions can 
only apply where parties to an intra-group transaction are part of the same group of 
compames. In a consolidation regime (such as the Australian model), intra-group 
transactions are ignored for income tax purposes. The underlying principles in terms of 
the section 45 intra-group transfers and the Australian consolidation regime therefore 
appear to be the same i.e. they are permitted in the context of a group of companies. 
It is submitted therefore, that section 45 represents the existence of an element of group 
taxation. 
1~8 Section 45(4)(b)(iii) 
12q Section 45(4)(c) 











6.5 Unbundling transactions 
6.5.1 General Requirements 
Unbundling transactions envisage the unbundling of a company (the unbundled 
company), which is either a South African resident or a controlled foreign company 13 I , in 
terms of which the shareholders of any listed company or the group company 
shareholders of an unlisted company (the unbundling company) acquire by way of a 
distribution in 5pecie, all the distributable shares held by the unbundling company and in 
terms of which the effective shareholding of the shareholders or group company 
shareholders in the underlying shares are not changed by the transaction 132. 
In addition to the requirements noted above, the following should also be taken 
cognisance of: 
• A listed unbundling company must be a South African resident 133; 
• The listed unbundling company must hold at least 35% of the equity shares in 
a listed unbundled company or hold more than 25% of the equity shares ifno 
other person holds an equal or greater amount 134; 
• The holding company of an unlisted unbundling company must form part of 
the same group of companies as the unlisted unbundling companyl35 and the 
131 Income Tax Act, Section 9D 
132 Huxham and Haupt, 2009, page 326; section 46 
133 Section 46( I ) 
1 H Proviso (i) to Sect ion 46( I ) 











unbundling company must hold more than 50% of the equity shares in an 
unlisted unbundled companyl36; and 
• Where the unbundled company is a controlled foreign company, the holding 
company of the unbundling company must own at least 95% of the equity 
shares in the unbundling company 137. 
The equity shares acquired by the shareholder of the unbundling company (i.e. the 
unbundled shares) must be acquired as trading stock, if held by the unbundling company 
as trading stock, and as capital assets, if held by the unbundling company as capital 
assets138• 
6.5.2 Roll-Over relief 
Section 46 lays down criteria for the allocation of the base cost and tax cost in terms of 
the unbundled shares. The base cost or tax cost (as the case may be) allocated to the 
unbundled shares is deemed to have been incurred on the same date as the date of the 
. . . f h bdl' h 139 acqUisItIon 0 t e un un mg s ares . The effect of these provisions is that the 
unbundling company does not make any capital gain or loss in terms of the acquisition of 
the unbundled sharesl40. 
Furthermore, the distribution of the unbundled shares to the shareholder of the 
unbundling company is not a dividend and therefore does not create any STC liability for 
the unbundling companyl41. 
136 Proviso (ii) to section 46(1) 
\37 Section 46(1 )( d) 
138 Section 46(3 )(a)(iii) 
139 Section 46(3 )(a)(iv) 











In the context of the distribution of shares in an unlisted unbundled company, section 46 
permits an unlisted unbundling company and its group company shareholder to jointly 
elect for the provisions of section 46 not to apply to that unbundling transaction 142. 
6.5.3 The existence of any group taxation provisions in section 46 
Generally, group taxation relief applies in the case of unbundling companies who are 
listed companies, as well as to a distribution by an unlisted unbundling company of its 
shareholding in an unlisted unbundled company to its shareholder, who together with it, 
forms part of the same group of companies. The effect of this distribution is that no STC 
or CGT arises in the unbundling company's hands. 
The unbundling relief in the context of listed companies is however, not dependant on the 
existence of a group of companies. 
Interestingly, there are no anti-avoidance provisions in section 46 as in the case of the 
other corporate rules. 
6.6 Transactions relating to liquidation, winding-up and deregistration 
These transactions are governed in terms of the provisions of section 47 of the Income 
Tax Act. 
6.6.1 General Requirements 
Section 47 applies in instances where a liquidating company distributes all its assets 
(other than assets retained to settle its trade debts) to its holding company in anticipation 
of, or in the course of the liquidation, winding-up or deregistration of the liquidating 
I~I Section 46(5)(a) 











company, and the liquidating company and its holding company form part of the same 
group of companies, or the holding company holds at least 95% of the liquidating 
company's equity shares l43 . 
The section 47 relief does not apply, infer alia, where the parties to a liquidating 
transaction jointly elect for it not to apply or where the liquidating company has not 
within 18 months of the liquidation distribution taken steps to liquidate, wind up or 
deregister, or to withdraw from or take steps which results in the liquidation, wind up or 
deregistration not taking place l44• 
6.6.2 Roll-Over relief 
The section 47 roll-over relief rules in terms of the following are also a mirror image of 
the roll-over relief provisions as discussed in terms of the rules applicable to 
amalgamation transactions l45 (i.e. the position of the liquidating company being similar 
to that of the amalgamating company and its holding company being similar to that of the 
resultant company): 
• The disposal of an asset held as a capital asset in terms of a distribution by the 
liquidating company to its holding company who acquires it as a capital asset l46; 
• The disposal of an asset held as trading stock in terms of a distribution by the 
liquidating company to its holding company who acquires it as trading stock l47; 
143 Section 46(1 )(a) 
144 Section 47(6) 
145 As set-out in paragraph 6.3.2.1 above 
146 Section 47(2)(a) 











• The disposal of an asset held as a capital asset (in respect of which capital 
allowances could be claimed) in terms of a distribution by the liquidating 
company to its holding company who acquires the capital asset on the same 
basis l48; and 
• The transfer of a business as a going concern where allowances have been 
claimed or are claimable under section 24C 149. 
A further requirement for the aforementioned relief is that the holding company must 
dispose of its shares in the liquidating company subject to the liquidation, winding-up or 
deregistration of the liquidating company, and the holding company has not assumed any 
of the liquidating company's debt other than the refinancing of any debt incurred more 
than 18 months prior to the disposal or it involves the assumption of ordinary trade debt 
of a business transferred to the holding company as a going concern 150. 
6.6.3 Anti-Avoidance provisions 
Where an asset disposed of in terms of a liquidation transaction is disposed of within 18 
months from the conclusion of the liquidating transaction, the anti-avoidance provisions 
as discussed in terms of the amalgamation transactions would apply and the tax 
implications which arise in the hands of the resultant company would equally apply to the 
holding company (of a liquidating company)151. 
6.6.4 The existence of any group taxation provisions in section -17 
The operation of the roll-over relief provisions, save in the case of a holding company 
which holds at least 95% of the equity shares in a liquidating company, apply only in a 
148 Section 47(3)(a) 
149 Section 47(3)(b) 
150 Section 47(3A) 











group of companies scenario (i.e. the liquidating company and the holding company must 
be part of the same group of companies in order to qualify for the section 47 roll-over 
relief). 
As in the case of most of the corporate rules sections, the effect of the section 47 relief is 
merely to delay the tax events which could arise in the future. This would appear to be in 
line with group taxation principles internationally. 
It is submitted that these are the only aspects of section 47 which display attributes of a 
group taxation regime. 
Based on the comments made with respect to the corporate rules above, it is submitted 
that the corporate rules as set-out in sections 41 to 47, whilst not qualifYing as a group 












Chapter 7: Other Group Taxation reliefs in the tax legislation 
The discussion in this chapter addresses whether or not there are any other sections in the 
Income Tax Act (other than the corporate rules) which display characteristics or attributes 
of a group taxation regime. Whilst an attempt has been made to highlight most of the 
sections displaying attributes or characteristics of group taxation, the sections highlighted 
should not be considered to be an exhaustive list of such provisions. 
As indicated in the introductory remarks in Chapter 6, group taxation characteristics or 
aspects which are to be found in the Value-Added Tax Act, the Securities Transfer Tax 
Act and the Transfer Duties Act will also be addressed in this chapter. 
7.1 Provisions in the Income Tax Act which could be construed as containing 
group taxation type provisions (other than the corporate rules) 
7.1.1 Connected Persons Definition 
Whilst the 'connected person' definition'52 itself is not a group relief provision, it is 
submitted the part of the definition dealing with companies has, in the context of a group 
of companies, a feeling of group taxation to it. Section I defines a 'connected person' in 
the context of a company, as: 
, .... any other company that would be part of the same group of companies as that company if the 
expression 'at least 70 per cent' in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of a 'group of 
companies' in this section were replaced by the expression 'more than 50 per cent'; ... " 
Clearly therefore, in the context of a group of companies (i.e. in terms of the 70% 
requirement) all companies within the group would be connected persons in relation to 
each other. There are other elements to the 'connected person' definition in as far as its 











reference to a company is concerned. These have however not been dealt with as they 
are not deemed relevant for the purposes ofthis research paper. 
7.1.2 Controlled Foreign Companies ("CFC's ") 
The taxation of erC's is dealt with in terms of section 90 153. The provisions of section 
90 are very complex and wide ranging. The comment on section 90 in the context of 
group taxation (and for purposes hereof) is at a conceptual level only. Accordingly, no 
in-depth analysis and comment on section 90 is required for purposes hereof. 
The significance of ere's is that where more than 50% of the voting rights or the 
participation rights in a foreign company are held by a South African resident, or held 
together with other South African residents, the income of that foreign company would 
generally be attributed to the taxable income of the South African resident in accordance 
with the voting or participation rights in the foreign company, unless certain exemptions 
apply. In circumstances such as these, the foreign company is regarded as a ere of the 
South African resident. 
There are certain instances in which the section 90 ere rules would not apply, for 
example, in terms of the foreign business establishment exemption 15-1. This exemption 
could apply in certain limited instances. The most popular one is where the foreign 
company is able to demonstrate that it has a place of business in the form of an office, 
shop, factory, warehouse or other structure that is used by the ere for the carrying on of 
its business and is used for the period of more than one year, and further, is suitably 
staffed with on-site management and staff of that ere, who are employed to render 
services on a full-time basis l55 • It is furthermore required in terms of this definition that 
the erC's place of business must be suitably equipped, has proper facilities, is located 
outside South Africa and is used for bonafide business purposes. 
153 Income Tax Act 
15~ Section 9D(9)(b) 











As the requirement for a foreign company is based on a 'more than 50%' level, it follows 
that where 70% or more of the equity shareholding (which includes 70% of the voting or 
participation rights) of a foreign company are held by a South African resident, that a 
CFC in this context could form part of a group of companies in terms ofthe wider section 
I 'group of companies' definition. 
Despite the fact that section 9D is a provision which is more anti-avoidance in nature (as 
it seeks to attribute the income of a passive offshore entity into the South African tax 
net), it is submitted that section 9D (to the extent that the income of a CFC is attributed to 
a South African resident group holding company), could be viewed as a group taxation 
provision. It is akin to the income of a subsidiary being attributed to a parent, and as if 
the parent and subsidiary form part of a single unit. 
7.1.3 Section 241(10) of the Income Tax Act 
The provisions of section 241 govern the taxation of gains and losses arising in terms of 
transactions concluded in foreign currency. Whilst section 241 is a fairly comprehensive 
provision and deals with many different instances in which foreign exchange gains and 
losses could arise, it is the implications of section 241(10) (and only in the context of its 
application to a group of companies) which are relevant for the purposes of this 
discussion. 
Section 241(10) essentially provides that foreign exchange differences arising in certain 
instances involving related companies must be ignored for income tax purposes. Of 
relevance for the purposes hereof are that group companies are impacted by the 
provisions of section 241(10)156. 











The effect of the provisions quoted below l57 is that foreign exchange differences arising 
in terms of the following transactions are deferred for income tax purposes: 
• Transactions between a South African resident ("SA Co") and a 
foreign company who is a connected person in relation to SA Co; 
• Transactions between SA Co and a CFC of SA Co (or any other 
South African company who is in the same group of companies as 
SA Co); or 
• Transactions between a CFC of SA Co and any other CFC of SA 
Co (or a CFC of another South African company resident company 
in the same group as SA Co). 
From the above it is clear that the deferring for income tax purposes of the foreign 
exchange differences in transactions involving the aforementioned parties in a group of 
(a) any resident in respect of any exchange difference determined on the translation 
of an exchange item to which that resident and any company are parties, where 
that company is-
(i) a connected person in relation to that resident; or 
(ii) a controlled foreign company in relation either to that resident or to 
any other company, which is a resident, and which other company 
forms part of the same group of companies as that resident; or 
(b) ... ; or 
(c) any controlled foreign company in relation to a resident in respect of any 
exchange difference determined on the translation of an exchange item to which 
that controlled foreign company and any other controlled foreign company in 
relation to either that resident or to any other resident company and which 
forms part of the same group of companies as that resident are party; ... 











companies' scenario, could be of assistance to a group company where, for example, a 
foreign exchange gain would have to be ignored for income tax purposes. Deferring a 
foreign exchange loss on the other hand, would mean that the foreign exchange loss 
could not be claimed as a deduction against the taxable income of the SA company. It is 
submitted that these provisions, to the extent that they relate to companies and groups of 
companies, are provisions containing elements of group taxation. 
7.1..1 Donations Tax 
Part V of the Income Tax Act contains the donations' tax provisions. In terms of these 
provisions, donations' tax is payable on the value of any property disposed of under any 
donation by a South African resident l58. A donation is defined as a gratuitous disposal of 
property or any waiver or renunciation of a right l59• Donations' tax is payable at the rate 
of20% on the value of the donation l6o . 
Section 56 of the Income Tax Act however exempts certain donations from donations' 
tax. More specifically, and in the context of a group of companies, a company donating 
property ('donor') to a South African resident company who is a member of the same 
group of companies as the donor, is exempted from liability for donations' tax l61 • 
The relief provided for in this provision is clearly aimed specifically in the group of 
companies' scenario. The exemption from donations' tax in this context appears to be 
consistent with the treatment applied in terms of a consolidation tax regime in which 
intra-group transfers are ignored for tax purposes and is therefore submitted to be an 
element of group taxation. 
158 Section 54; Huxham and Haupt, 2009, p.666 
159 As defined in section 55 
160 Section 64; Huxham and Haupt, 2009, p.666 











7.1.5 Dividend .. and STC 
STC at the rate of 10 % is generally payable by a company declaring a dividend to its 
shareholders. A detailed definition of a dividend (not relevant for the purposes of this 
research paper) is contained in section I of the Income Tax Act. Of relevance however 
would be the exclusions in terms of the dividend definition. 
In this regard, paragraph (g) of the definition of a 'dividend' provides that an amount 
distributed by a company to its holding company in circumstances where the company 
and its holding company form part of the same group of companies (in terms of the 
section 41 definition), the amount distributed would not be a dividend to the extent that 
the holding company reduces the cost of the shares held in the declaring company in 
accordance with the generally accepted accounting practice, as a result of that 
distribution l62. 
The effect of this paragraph is that if a company becomes part of a group of companies, 
any realised and unrealised pre-acquisition profits can be paid to the holding company 
without triggering a liability to pay STC I63 • 
Whilst this appears to be a form of group relief, all it succeeds in doing is giving rise to a 
CGT liability in the hands of the company, as the distribution is a repayment of capital 
for CGT purposes 1M. 
Part VII of the Income Tax Act contains the STC provisions which come into operation 
once a dividend declaration has occurred. Section 648(5) however also contains a 
provision which at the election of the company declaring the dividend, exempts dividends 
161 Paragraph (g) of the definition of a 'dividend as provided for in section I of the Income Tax Act 
163 Huxham and Haupt, 2009, page 346 











from attracting STC. In this regard, section 64B(5)(t) requires the following to be 
applicable in order for the exemption from STC to apply: 
• The company declaring the dividend, and its shareholder, in whose favour the 
dividend is declared, must form part of the same group of companies. (Note 
however that the declaration of a dividend by the shareholder company to its 
subsidiary cannot qualify for this exemption); 
• The dividend is taken into account In the determination of the profits of the 
shareholder company; 
• The shareholder company would be subject to STC where the shareholder 
company on-declares the dividend and not elect for the section 64B(5)(t) relief to 
apply to this dividend; 
• The dividend does not consist of shares in the shareholder company; and 
• In electing for the section 64B(5)(f) election to apply, the company declaring the 
dividend has to notify SARS in writing (of the election) in the appropriate form 
prescribed by no later than the day on which the STC would have been due l65• 
Important to note further is the fact that the receipt of a dividend which was subject to the 
section 64B(5)(f) exemption cannot be taken into account by the shareholding company 
in calculating its available STC credits l66. 
The 64B(5)(t) exemption is clearly only available to the extent that the company 
declaring the dividend and the shareholding company (in whose favour the dividend has 
been declared) form part of the same group of companies. This accordingly represents a 
form of group taxation relief. As in the instance of the corporate rules however, the relief 
165 Section 64B(5)(f) 











is of a temporary nature, as STC could be triggered (if the shareholding company does 
not have STC credits at its disposal which exceed the dividend on-declared) when the 
shareholding company on-declares the dividend received from its subsidiary. 
7.1.6 Deemed Dividend<; 
The Income Tax Act also contains provisions in terms which certain transactions are 
deemed to be dividends. These provisions are aimed at countering schemes in which 
amounts are distributed by a company in a form other than the declaration of a dividend 
or a deemed declaration as contemplated in section 648 167• These deemed dividends give 
rise to a liability for STC in the hands of the company that is deemed to have declared the 
dividend. As in the case of section 648, section 64C, which identifies in which instances 
a deemed dividend would arise, contains an exemption-provision which provides for 
relief from STC. In this regard, section 64C(4)(k) provides that the amounts 
contemplated below, which are distributed, transferred, released, relieved, paid, settled, 
used, applied, granted or made available for the benefit of a shareholder who forms part 
of the same group of companies as the person that is deemed to have declared the 
dividend, or a connected person to that shareholder, if the connected person and the 
shareholder form part of the same group of companies, would be exempted from the 
section 64C deeming provisions. 
The exemptions from the section 64C deeming provisions are the following: 
• Any cash or asset distributed or transferred by a company to or for the benefit of 
its shareholder or any connected person in relation to that shareholder l68; 
• Where the shareholder or a connected person in relation to it is released from a 
monetary obligation owed by the shareholder or the connected person to a 
167 Huxham and Haupt, 2009, page 364 











company, provided that the amount owing has not already been deemed to be a 
dividend 169; 
• Where the company pays a debt owmg by its shareholding company or a 
connected person of the shareholder170; 
• An amount applied or used by a company, other than in the aforesaid ways, for 
the benefit of the shareholder, or a connected person of that shareholder l7l ; and 
• A loan or advance granted to the shareholder or a connected person of that 
shareho Ider 172. 
The aforementioned section 64C exemptions, as in the case of the section 648 exemption 
is dependant solely on the existence of a group of companies, without which, no 
exemption from STC would be available. This too can be considered to be an element of 
group taxation. 
7.1.7 The ffh Schedule to the Income Tax Act 
Tax relief provisions which are premised on the existence of a group of companies are 
also to be found in the 8th schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
7.1.7.1 Paragraph 12 
Paragraph 12 of the 8th schedule applies in terms of events treated as disposals and 
acquisitions thereby giving rise to a CGT liability. Paragraph 12(5) applies where a 
16'> Section 64C(2)(b) 
110 Section 64C(2)( c) 
171 Section 64C(2)(d) 











creditor discharges, or reduces a debt owed by a person to a creditor for no consideration, 
or where the creditor reduces the debt owed, the debtor would be regarded as having 
made a profit on the sale ofa claim. The provisions of paragraph 12(5) would not apply 
however, where the debtor and creditor are both part of the same group of companies, 
provided the transactions were not part of a scheme to avoid any paragraph 12(5) liability 
and the debt had been acquired outside the group of companies or the companies became 
part of the group of companies only after the debt arose 173• 
The aforementioned could be considered to be a form of group relief from a CGT 
perspective. As the relief available in paragraph 12(5) is dependant on the existence of a 
group of companies, it is submitted that this too is an element of group taxation. 
7.1.7.2 Para!,'Taph 39 
An example of a restrictive provision in the 8th schedule of the Income Tax Act is to be 
found in paragraph 39. In terms of this paragraph, a company ("transferor') must 
disregard a capital loss arising from the disposal of an asset to another company that is a 
member of the same group of companies as the transferor immediately after the 
disposal 174. This is another example of an attribute which could be found in a group 
taxation regime. 
7.1. 7.3 Paragraph 64B 
A further example of a group taxation provision is the 'participation exemption' relief in 
th IT terms of paragraph 64B of the 8 schedule :>. This paragraph exempts from CGT, the 
disposal by a person ('transferor') who holds at least 20% of the equity share capital and 
173 Paragraph 12(5) 
174 Huxham and Haupt, 2009, page 816; paragraph 39 of the 8th schedule to the Income Tax Act. This 
paragraph also has application with reference to a disposal by a person to a connected person in relation to 
that transferor prior to the disposal 











the voting rights in a foreign company (for a period of at least 18 months prior to the 
disposal) and the disposal is to a non-resident who is not a controlled foreign company 
("CFC"), or in terms of a deemed disposal as a result of a person or CFC ceasing to be a 
resident, or further, in terms of a disposal to the CFC of the transferor, or a CFC who 
forms part of the same group of companies as the transferor l76. 
The relief attributable to a group of companies is that the 'at least 20%' requirement in 
terms of the equity shareholding and voting rights would also be satisfied if the joint 
equity shareholding and the voting rights of two or more companies forming part of the 
same group of companies together, make up at least 20%177. Paragraph 648 does contain 
certain anti-avoidance provisions. A discussion thereof is however not deemed necessary 
for the purposes hereof. 
It is submitted that the aforementioned provisions, In addition to the corporate rules 
referred to in Chapter 6, represent elements present in the Income Tax Act which are 
consistent with the workings of a group taxation regime. 
7.2 Elements of group taxation existing in other South African tax legislation 
This part seeks to identify to what extent elements of group taxation exist in other South 
African tax legislation, such as the VAT Act, the Transfer Duties Act and the Security 
Transfer Tax Act. 
7.2.1 The VAT Act 
Section 8(25) of the VAT Act applies to transactions taking place in terms of the 
corporate rules as provided for in the Income Tax Act. In this regard where transactions 
involve the transfer of goods and services from one vendor to another in terms of sections 
176 Paragraph 64B of the 8th schedule to the Income Tax Act 











42, 44, 45 or 47, the VAT Act treats these transactions as non-supplies as both vendors 
are treated as one and the same person 178. It is submitted that the underlying approach in 
terms of section 8(25) (in the context of the corporate rules) appears to be that the VAT 
Act treats a group of companies as one unit and, as in the case of a group taxation regime, 
for example a consolidation regime, ignores the intra-group transfer of assets. 
A further point to take note of is a practice of SARS, in the context of the intra-group 
supply of goods and services, in circumstances where the group companies have failed to 
account for both input and output V A T due, for example, to the existence of an error on 
their accounts payable and accounts receivable systems. The net result of such an error 
occurring is that there would be an under-declaration to SARS of output V A T (in terms 
of the company rendering the taxable supply), as well as an under-claim of input VAT (in 
terms of the company receiving the taxable supply). Based on the first-hand knowledge 
of the writer and in terms of taxpayers whose identity cannot be disclosed for the 
purposes of this research paper, SARS has in instances such the one described above, 
remitted both interest and penalties raised on assessment, based on the argument that the 
intra-group supply of goods and services give rise to an 'in-and an out', in the sense that 
the group company rendering the taxable supply would typically pay over output V A T to 
SARS, whereas the other group company would simultaneously, be entitled to a claim for 
input VAT in terms of the acquisition of the supplies. This approach of SARS is an 
indication that even SARS is prepared, in certain instances (in the absence of legislation 
to that effect), to accept the implications of the existence of a group of companies and the 
practical realities of intra-group transactions. 
7.2.2 The Transfer Duty Act 
Transfer duty is in terms of section 2 of the Transfer Duty Act imposed on the transfer of, 
inter alia, fixed property situated in South Africa, with the transfer duty being payable by 











the acquirer of the propertyl79. Transfer duty is payable by either a natural person or a 
company, as the case may be. 
Section 9 of the Transfer Duty Act is an exemption provision and exempts, infer alia, a 




A I · . 180 nama gamatlon transaction ; 
A . . 181 d n mtra-group transactIOn ; an 
A liquidation distribution l82. 
The exemption from transfer duty in terms of asset-for-share transactions is dealt with 
under a different exemption provision l83. In terms of this provision, the asset-for-share 
transactions l84 are exempted from transfer duty if the section 8(25) VAT exemption l85 
applies and a declaration confirming the VAT exemption is furnished. 
It appears that transfer duty is exempted as a result of the transferee company (or the 
resultant company, or the holding company of the liquidating company, as the case may 
be) effectively stepping into the shoes of the transferor company (or the amalgamating 
company, or the liquidating company, as the case may be). It is submitted that these 
exemptions too, are premised on the philosophy of group taxation. 
179 'property' is defined in section I of the Transfer Duty Act and includes real rights in land (excluding 
mortgage bonds and certain leased property and lots, the rights or sub-lease of the rights, the shares or 
member's interest in a residential property company and certain contingent rights to property) 
180 Income Tax Act, section 44 
181 Ibid, section 45 
18c Ibid, section 47 
183 Section 9(15A) ofthe Transfer Duty Act; Huxham and Haupt, 2009, page 903 
184 In terms of the provisions of section 42 of the Income Tax Act 











7.2.3 Securities Transfer Tax 
Securities Transfers Tax is a tax imposed on the transfer of all shares in companies (and 
the members' interest in close corporations) incorporated in South Africa, and on transfer 
of shares in foreign companies listed on a South African stock exchange '86• The 
Securities Transfer Tax Act effectively replaced the Stamp Duties Act l87 with reference 
to the transfer of the beneficial interest in a share or a security 188. 
Section 8 of the Securities Transfer Tax Act exempts from Securities Transfer Tax the 
transfer of securities in terms of section 42 to section 47 of the Income Tax Act. As in 
the case of transfer duty, it is submitted that this exemption from securities transfer tax is 
premised on the philosophy of group taxation as this particular exemption is clearly 
aimed to give the same protection provided in terms of the Income Tax Act, the VAT Act 
and the Transfer Duty Act. 
Based on the views highlighted in the discussion in chapter 6, as well as the discussion in 
this chapter, it is submitted that the provisions highlighted therein are clear indicators that 
many elements of group taxation exist presently in the South African context. The key 
features of the classic group taxation regimes, for example, the consolidation regime and 
group relief regime (i.e. the entitlement of a group of companies to consolidate into one 
entity for income tax purposes, or the ability to transfer losses between companies 
forming part of the same group of companies) do not however, apply in the South African 
context. It is the absence of these key features which lead people to conclude that group 
taxation does not exist in South Africa, whereas a careful study of the South African tax 
legislation would highlight that there are elements of group taxation present, as opposed 
to not being present at all. 
186 Section 2 of the Securities Transfer Tax 
187 No.77 of 1968 











Chapter 8 seeks to address the question on why South Africa does not have a formal 












Chapter 8: Is South Africa disadvantaged by not having Group Taxation 
(incorporating the informal views of a senior official of National Treasury)? 
Chapters 6 and 7 highlighted the provisions in the Income Tax Act, which in the view of 
the writer could be construed as containing elements of group taxation. 
This chapter will seek to address why the Katz Commission's recommendations on group 
taxation were not implemented, what National Treasury's view on group taxation is, and 
what it intends doing in terms of implementing group taxation. 
In this regard, an informal interview was held with a senior official in the Department of 
National Treasury. The views expressed by this senior official are the views of the 
individual concerned, but in all likelihood represent what the thinking behind National 
Treasury's lack of action in terms of group taxation is. 
The following represent the informal views expressed by the senior official concerned in 
response to the questions raised below: 
8.1 Why have the recommendations of the Katz Commission not been implemented? 
Group taxation has always been on National Treasury's agenda as an issue that 
requires addressing. The main challenge however is one of priority. Addressing 
the concept of group taxation is not viewed as one that requires prioritization at 
this stage. Therefore, the failure to respond to the recommendations of the Katz 
Commission does not indicate that National Treasury is not entertaining any 
thoughts on the implementation of group taxation. 
Furthermore, from National Treasury's perspective (i.e. the official's perspective), 
elements of group taxation exist in the Income Tax Act, for example, intra-group 
transactions in terms of the corporate rules, STC exemptions and foreign currency 











8.2 Was the introduction of the corporate rules only in response to the advent ofCCT 
(as indicated in the explanatory memorandum to the 2001 Amendment Act), or 
was its introduction to some extent motivated by group taxation considerations? 
The introduction of CGT goes beyond group taxation, as group taxation is but one 
of the elements of CGT. It was as a result of CGT that the corporate rules were 
introduced, as in the absence thereof, mergers, in the context of a multi-tier group 
could give rise to adverse CGT consequences for companies within the group. 
This is viewed as being in line with international practice. 
8.3 What is National Treasury's view on f.,TJ"OUp taxation? 
Save for re-iterating that group taxation IS always an item that remams on 
National Treasury's 'to-do' list, the question really is what do people want out of 
group taxation? 
From the senior official's perspective the debate remains at a theoretical level (i.e. 
consolidation or group relief ('loss transfer')) as opposed to dealing with group 
taxation at a practical level. At the practical level, the main issues appear to be 
the foIlowing: 
• Loss sharing; 
• The treatment of intra-group charges such as interest, royalties and 
management fees; 
• Whether a group of companies should file one tax return or many returns; 
• Liability for tax: Should this lie with the parent or the subsidiary or should 











• The possible strengthening of the corporate rules; 
• Is group taxation beneficial or burdensome? This is based on the view 
that a full-blown group taxation regime is very complex and compliance 
with it would be very burdensome and complicated and would take up a 
significant amount ofSARS' resources; 
• Is group taxation feasible or beneficial? As to whether or not it would be 
beneficial, the reality is that out of a population of 45 million, only 8 
million are taxpayers. Of these 8 million taxpayers, approximately 250 -
300 are listed companies. It is these few companies which potentially 
stand to gain from group taxation. From this perspective, one has to 
question whether or not it is worthwhile to go for full group taxation. 
Going forward, the senior official is of the view given that group taxation is 
potentially very complex, it is likely to drain a considerable amount of the jiscus' 
resources and the issue is whether one goes for a full-blown group taxation 
regime such as in the case of Australia, or does one deal with selected aspects of 
group taxation. 
8.4 What should be done: 
The official is of the view that the following would go a long way towards settling 
the debate on group taxation in the South African context: 
• Permitting the sharing of losses between group companies; 











• Addressing how intra-group charges such as interest, royalties and 
management fees should be treated; 
• The possible ring-fencing of a company's losses prior to it joining a group; 
• The possible adjustment of base costs in intra-group transfers. At present, 
base costs do not adjust in terms of intra-group transactions, which could 
give rise to artificial losses; 
• Attributing all CFC income to one company in South Africa; 
• Substance should follow form. In the SA context the substance has 
difficulty following the form and the challenge would be to get the form 
back to where the substance is; and 
• Addressing what one would consider to be a sufficient shareholding 
requirement in a group, for example a 70% or a 50% holding requirement. 
8.5 The way fom1ard 
To the extent that further elements of group taxation are to be introduced, the 
official is of the view that an incremental approach to group taxation should be 
applied. The official is also of the view that National Treasury is less inclined 
towards introducing a full consolidation model such as the Australian model and 
is more inclined towards a blend between the fiscal unity approach (applied in the 
Netherlands which is much less complex) and the UK group relief (loss-sharing) 
regime. The official however did not elaborate on how the fiscal unity and the 
group relief approaches would be blended. 
As stated in chapter 7 above, whilst certain elements of group taxation are prevalent in 











consolidation or the ability to transfer losses between member group companies do not 
currently apply in the South African context. 
Whilst, as indicated in Chapter 2 above, there has been a call for group taxation to be 
implemented in South Africa, the question that requires answering is whether or not 
South Africa is in need of a group taxation regime and whether or not South Africa is 
worse off for not having group taxation. 
8.6 Does South Africa need group taxation? 
The introduction of a group taxation regime in South Africa would put South Africa on 
par with other international tax jurisdictions already having such regimes in place. The 
presence of a group taxation regime, coupled with its potential tax benefits, would be a 
factor to be taken into account by potential foreign investors in deciding on whether or 
not to invest in South Africa, as tax is usually one of the determining factors in gauging 
the viability of a venture or investment. 
Clearly, group taxation would only be of benefit to companies and not to individuals, 
who, in terms of their contributions towards national revenue actually contributed more 
than what companies had for the 2008/2009 tax yearl89. It is however, evident that 
companies contribute significantly towards the South African economy. Not only from a 
tax perspective, but also from an employment perspective, as their business activities 
could, depending on their income producing activities and income producing structures, 
lead to employment opportunities for the greater South African pUblic. 
With reference to the potential tax benefits for a group of companies, one of the most 
significant features of a group regime would be the ability for group companies to 
transfer losses from a loss-making company to a profit-making company, thereby 
resulting in a lower tax burden for the group as a whole. The group would, depending on 











the form of group tax regime chosen, potentially be able to file just one tax return on 
behalf of the entire group. 
The reality of the situation is however, that SARS in all likelihood, does not possess the 
level of sophistication and level of resources to implement a group taxation regime. This 
could be inferred given that SARS and National Treasury appear to be struggling from a 
logistical and administrative perspective, in terms of the implementation of the new 
dividend tax regime, as the commencement date thereof has now been pushed back to 
late 2010. 
Given the apparent difficulties in terms of the coming into operation of the new dividend 
tax legislation, it begs the following question: Does SARS have the necessary resources 
and ability to implement a group taxation regime? The answer appears to have been 
provided by the National Treasury official interviewed, who clearly stated that one of the 
main factors weighing against adopting a group taxation regime would be resources and 
whether or not SARS would be able to maintain and service such a regime. 
Moreover, the adoption of a group taxation regime could give rise to a loss of revenue to 
the jiSCliS as group member companies would be able to transfer losses to profit making 
companies. The counter argument to this would be that the loss of revenue should be 
viewed as an investment with the return on the investment being realized when foreign 
conglomerates decide to invest in South Africa, thereby potentially generating additional 
taxable and employment opportunities. 
The difference however between the introduction of the new dividend tax regime as 
opposed to the introduction of a group taxation regime is that the dividend tax regime 
replaces an existing tax i.e. STC, whereas group tax would generally be a tax relief 
measure for groups of companies. Coupled with this is the fact, as stated by the National 
Treasury official, that group taxation, (given its potential complexity, and given the 
resources that would be required to ensure its efficiency and efficacy), would only be of 











Whilst the absence of a group tax regime results in group member companies not being 
able to transfer losses to profit-making companies, branches of a company are permitted 
to do so (as one is still dealing with one individual taxpayer). It is also a fact that certain 
petroleum companies and certain companies involved in the construction industry have 
various divisions within an operating company, with each division running its own 
business. These companies would, for example, draw up tax computations and raise 
doubtful debt provisions for each division, etc, where-after the results of all the divisions 
would be consolidated into one set of financial statements with one tax computation. The 
result is that the consolidation of the accounts of each division into one consolidated set 
of accounts of the operating company, bring about results very similar to those of group 
member companies in a consolidated regime scenario. 
It could also be argued that the introduction of a group taxation regime could result in the 
engineering of intricate and complex tax avoidance schemes aimed at securing tax 
benefits by employing ways and means not intended by National Treasury, as appears to 
have been the case with the section 45 intra-group rules l90. National Treasury had found 
that section 45 caused asymmetry between assets transferred and the consideration 
received in exchange for those assets. The assets transferred retained a rolled-over base 
cost, whereas the consideration received in exchange obtained a market value tax cost, 
with this asymmetry having been used by taxpayers to artificially cash-out subsidiary 
operations on a tax-free basis (an eventuality for which section 45 was never intended)191. 
This notwithstanding, it is submitted that nothing would prevent SARS from utilizing the 
general anti-avoidance rules in thwarting any complex and intricate tax avoidance 
scheme devised by a taxpayer. 
)90 National Treasury Media Statement, 2008, p.3 











Considering the aforementioned remarks and submissions, and given that only a small 
portion of the South African population, i.e. approximately 8 million l92 are registered 
taxpayers, therefore resulting in the South African tax-base being very small, it is 
submitted that South Africa does not need group taxation at this stage. It is submitted 
that the Income Tax Act and the other tax legislation provide sufficient tax relief for 
group companies in South Africa, and that South Africa is not disadvantaged by not 
having a group taxation regime in place. In fact, it is submitted that the presence of a 
group taxation regime would lead to less taxes being collected from group companies in 
South Africa (as group companies would be capable of transferring losses amongst 
themselves), which could potentially prejUdice the South African fisclIs, should these 
companies not increase the level of their local investment or fail to create any additional 
employment opportunities. 
The writer is however of the view that as the South African tax base and the South 
African economy grows, the adoption of a group taxation regime would become 
inevitable. Taking the decision to adopt group taxation would however be easier than 
deciding on the appropriate regime, i.e. Consolidation or Group (loss) relief? 












This research paper's aim was to provide a contextual analysis of group taxation in South 
Africa. It is submitted that the contents of Chapters 2 to 8 have achieved this. 
In doing so, an overview of what group taxation and the various forms in which it 
operates were highlighted. An overview of how a consolidated group regime operates in 
Australia and how a group reliefregime operates in the UK was provided. 
The recommendations of the Margo and Katz commissions on group taxation were also 
examined. 
It was also established that elements of group taxation were present in terms of, inter 
alia, the corporate rules, the exemption provisions in terms of donations' tax, STC and 
CGT, as well as the exemptions in terms of V A T, Securities Transfer Tax and Transfer 
Duty. 
The informal views of a senior official in National Treasury in terms of the practical 
issues which need to be addressed if group tax were to be implemented were highlighted, 
as well as the official's views on why the Katz Commission's recommendations were not 
followed. It would appear, based on the comments of the official concerned, that 
National Treasury has given serious consideration to the implementation of a group 
taxation regime. 
As alluded to above and as highlighted in chapter 6, it is clear that the corporate rules, in 
particular section 45, but also sections 46, 47 and 42 do contain elements of a group 
taxation regime. The same could be said, for example, of the CFC rules in terms of 
section 90, the donations' tax exemptions in terms of section 56, the STC exemptions in 
section 648 and section 64C, the provisions of paragraphs 12(5) and 648 of the 8th 











exemptions (in terms of the Transfer Duties Act) and the Security Transfers Tax 
exemptions (in terms of the Security Transfers Tax Act). 
The presence of the aforementioned, as well other provisions (highlighted In earlier 
chapters) provide sufficient evidence that but for the absence of the significant features of 
a group tax regime, for example, the ability to transfer losses between group companies, 
the South African tax legislation does contain many elements of a group taxation regime. 
It is for this reason submitted that the absence of a formal group taxation regime does not 
currently place South African taxpayers at a distinct disadvantage, especially given the 
writer's views that South African is presently not ready for the introduction of group 
taxation. 
Notwithstanding these views, and given National Treasury's recent propensity to borrow 
significantly from the tax legislation of other jurisdictions (for example, the general anti-
avoidance rules, which appear to have been copied from the Canadian tax legislation), it 
cannot be discounted that a group taxation regime could be introduced in South Africa 
within the next 5 years. Were this to happen, it is hoped that common-sense prevails and 
that the group tax regime would be one which builds on the existing group tax-related 











Area for further research 












I. Tickle, D (2009) - Full group tax system imperative in current economic 
meltdown - SAICA Communique News Service - 18 June 2009 SAICA website -
www.saica.co.zalNews/MediaKitlPublications/ 
2. Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International (2004) - International Fiscal Association, 
2004 Vienna Congress - Studies in International Fiscal Law, Volume 89b, 
Group Taxation, Sdu Fiscale & Financiele Uitgewers, (2004) 
3. Greenwoods and Freehills guide to Tax Consolidation for corporate groups in 
Australia, Greenwoods and Freehills Pty Limited (2004). 
4. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Tax Structure of the Republic of 
South Africa, (The Margo Commission) Pretoria, South Africa, Government 
Printers, 1987. 
5. Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax 
Structure of South Africa, (The Katz Commission (I)), Pretoria, South Africa, 
Government Printers, 1994. 
6. Third Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax 
Structure of South Africa, (The Katz Commission (3)), Pretoria, South Africa, 
Government Printers, 1995. 
7. In Touch with Ernst & Young, February 1996, Published by Ernst & Young, 
South Africa, Johannesburg, 1996. 
8. Income Tax Act No.58 of 1962 (as amended), Professional Tax Handbook 
2008/2009, 18th edition, Volume I, Lexisnexis, South Africa, 2008. 
9. Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 1988, Republic of South Africa, Government 
Printer. 
10. Second Revenue Laws Amendment Act No.60, 200 I, Republic of South Africa, 
Government Printer. 
II. Revenue Laws Amendment Act No.74, 2002, Republic of South Africa, 
Government Printer. 












13. Taxation Laws Amendment Act No.3, 2008, Republic of South Africa, 
Government Printer. 
14. Value-Added Tax Act No.89 of 1991 (as amended), Indirect Tax Handbook 
2008/2009, Lexisnexis, South Africa, 2008. 
15. Securities Transfer Tax Act No.25 of 2007, Indirect Tax Handbook 2008/2009, 
Lexisnexis, South Africa, 2008. 
16. Transfer Duty Act NoAO of 1949, Indirect Tax Handbook 2008/2009, Lexisnexis, 
South Africa, 2008. 
17. Notes on South African Income Tax, 2009 Huxham and Haupt, H & H 
Publications, Hedron Tax Consulting and Publishing CC, South Africa. 
18. Tolley Tax Training, Reed Elsevier UK Ltd, 2008; LexisNexis Tax Tutor Online; 
Internet link http://wwwl.lexisnexis.co.ukltaxtutor/corp_tax.html. accessed on 29 
June 2009. 
19. SAICA Website - www.saica.co.za/brochures/; accessed on 22 July 2009. 
20. Media Statement by the Minister of Finance, Mr Trevor A Manuel, MP, on the 
preliminary revenue results for the fiscal year 2008/2009, South Africa 
Government Information website; 
www.info.gov.za/speeches/2009/0904020409451005.htm; accessed on 28 July 
2009. 
21. Media Statement - National Treasury - Taxation Laws Amendment Bills, 2008: 
Company Restructuring Measures, 21 February 2008. 
22. The 2009 Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, 2009, Ernst & Young, EYGM 
Limited. 
90 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
